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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is vested in the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k)(1994 as 
amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final Order of summary judgment 
entered on August 5, 1994, dismissing the Plaintiff's action for 
defamation of character (slander per se) and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable David S. Young 
presiding. 
In particular, Plaintiff appeals the trial Court's failure to 
assess the materiality of disputed issues of fact; the trial 
court's complete failure to review a material piece of evidence 
which was provided to the court in the form of a video tape 
recording the defendant made while the Plaintiff was shopping at 
the Defendant's store. The content of the video recording went to 
the principal facts of whether the Defendant acted reasonably or 
had probable cause. The trial court selected just one of the 
disputed facts, only to draw all reasonable inferences from the 
"selected" fact in favor of the moving party. 
This appeal also argues the trial court applied the wrong 
legal standards or produced a deficient legal analysis to the 
disputed facts of the case. The appeal further contests the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-11-18 which 
appears to encroach the Open Court provisions of Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
When entertaining a motion for summary judgmentf the trial 
court is required to draw all inferences fairly arising from the 
facts presented in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
The trial Court failed to assess the materiality of the facts of 
this case and the disputes arising from the facts.1 Although the 
Defendant failed to meet its duty to show it had probable cause or 
that it acted reasonably,2 the trial court selected just one of the 
disputed material facts and drew all reasonable inferences 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the Defendant, the moving 
party. Thus, the trial court erroneously applied the wrong legal 
standards, or produced a deficient legal analysis. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-11-18(1975 as amended) denies 
people wrongly accused of shoplifting their constitutional right 
to seek redress in Utah courts in violation of Article I, Section 
11 of the Utah State Constitution. 
1
. The Plaintiff provided a video tape recording to the trial court in 
support of his answer opposing the motion for summary judgment [Addendum I]. 
The video tape had the effect of defeating the Defendant's claims of privilege 
in showing the Appellee did not have probable cause or reason to accuse the 
Appellant of retail theft. The trial court failed to review the recording on 
the video tape and, therefore, could not assess its disputed elements and 
their materiality. 
2
. See Terry v. Zions, 605 P.2d 314, on rehearing, 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1979)(shopkeepers must have probable cause before arresting a person ). 
2 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (c) . 
...[T]he judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law... 
Utah Code Annotated 78-11-18 (1975 as amended). [Merchant's 
authority to detain.] 
Any merchant who has reason to believe that 
merchandise has been wrongfully taken by an 
individual contrary to Section 78-11-15 or 78-
11-16 and that he can recover such merchandise 
by taking such individual into custody and 
detaining him may, for the purpose of 
attempting to effect such recovery or for the 
purpose of informing a peace officer of the 
circumstances of such detention, take the 
individual into custody and detain him in a 
reasonable manner and for a reasonable length 
of time. Such taking into custody and 
detention by a merchant or his employee shall 
not render such merchant or his employee 
criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, 
false imprisonment, slander or unlawful 
detention or for any type of claim or action 
unless the custody and detention are 
unreasonable under all circumstances. 
Utah State Constitution Article I, Section 11. Courts Open — 
Redress of injuries. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for any injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 3, 1993, Plaintiff John Priddy [hereinafter "the 
Appellant"] filed a complaint for defamation of character [slander 
per se] and negligent infliction of emotional distress against 
Shopko Corporation, [hereinafter "the Appellee"]. The Appellant 
alleged that the Appellee's security operatives falsely and 
maliciously accused him of retail theft. The Appellee filed a 
motion for summary judgment claiming it deserved summary judgment 
as a matter of law because there were not any disputed issues of 
material fact and that it was privileged or had probable cause in 
accusing the Appellant of retail theft. The Appellee also argued 
that the Appellant did not suffer emotional distress. 
The Appellant filed an Answer opposing the motion for summary 
judgment. The Appellant's opposition memorandum included several 
supporting affidavits3 and a video tape recording which featured 
the Appellee's security operatives conducting an in-depth 
camera(s) surveillance of the Appellant from the instant the 
Appellant entered the* Appellee's store. 
Prior to the motion for summary judgment, the Appellant 
filed a Motion to Compel the production of certain discovery the 
Appellee had refused to provide.4 The Appellant planned to amend 
his Verified Complaint to conform to the evidence received after 
discovery and to substitute negligent infliction of emotional 
distress with intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
Appellant desired this substitution because the evidence contained 
3
. See specifically Affidavit of Jolene Priddy. Addendum F. 
4
. The Motion to Compel which predated the Appellee's motion for summary 
judgment, required certain evidence of material importance which, if produced, 
would have gone to the important issues of privilege and probable cause. 
4 
in the video tape recording showed the Appellee did not have 
probable cause but acted with malice. Because the trial court 
found that a favorable judgment on the Appellee's motion would 
moot the other issues, it did not hear the Appellant's other 
motions. 
Although the trial court did not entertain the Motion to 
Compel, the Appellant submitted enough evidence to support the 
materiality of the disputed facts in opposing the motion for 
summary judgment. The trial court did not review all the evidence 
the Appellant submitted to show the unequivocal existence of 
disputed material issues of fact. The Appellant maintains that 
the video recording of 45 minutes of in-store camera surveillance 
shows disputed issues of material fact. And, the trial court held 
that, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-11-18, (1975 as amended),5 
the Appellee was privileged6 in accusing the Plaintiff of retail 
theft and blamed the Appellant for the occurrences. The trial 
Court certified its Order as final for purposes of appeal 
[Addendum A]. The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court [Addendum B]. The Supreme Court assigned the 
appeal to this Honorable Court [Addendum C]. 
5
. The trial court miscited the statute. It cited to U.C.A. § 78-12-17 and 
18. Perhaps the trial court meant to cite to 78-11-17 and 18 (1975 as 
amended). 
6
. The video recording was submitted- specifically to demonstrate to the 
trial court that the Appellee acted, with malice and had no privilege in 
accusing the Appellant of retail theft. Had the trial court observed the 
content of the recording, it is unequivocal it would have reached a different 
decision. See Transcript at Page 25, lines 8-17. 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As this case comes to this Court on a summary judgment 
ruling, the Appellant respectfully offers the following fac^s 
based on the facts alleged in his Verified Complaint [Addendum 
D], and in his Answer and Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment [Addendum E]. 
a. On February 20, 1993, Ms. Jolene Patience—now known as 
Jolene Priddy—purchased a set of hair curlers (hereinafter "the 
set") from the Appellee's store located in Sugarhouse, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
b. A few days later, Ms. Priddy noticed the set was 
defective and returned it to the store. The store was out of this 
particular merchandise. The store's customer service clerk gave 
Ms. Priddy a rain check document so she could make the exchange at 
another date. The clerk also told Ms. Priddy to keep the 
defective rollers until the exchange. 
c. On Sunday, February 28, 1993, The Appellant, a black 
man, and Ms. Priddy, went to the Appellee's store to use the rain 
check and to shop for other items. 
d. At the store, the Appellant shopped around and selected 
a few household items which were held in plain view and which he 
intended to buy. The Appellant also helped Ms. Priddy select a 
replacement set of hair curlers. 
e. The Appellant went to the checkout counter after he 
completed his shopping, to pay for the household items. At the 
same time, Ms. Priddy, as she was instructed to do, went to the 
customer service desk located behind the checkout counter to use 
6 
the rain check and exchange the defective set for the new set of 
curlers. 
f. While the Appellant was still at the checkout counter 
paying for the items he selected, Ms. Priddy returned to the 
checkout counter to show the checkout clerk that the merchandise 
exchange was done properly. 
g. After paying the checkout clerk for the itemsf the 
Appellant and Ms. Priddy left the store. 
h. Several of Appellee's security operatives surrounded the 
Appellant and Ms. Priddy in the parking lot. Ms. Jackie Boysen, 
the Appellee's loss prevention supervisor, loudly accused the 
Appellant of retail theft and demanded to inspect his shopping 
bags. See Affidavits of Jolene Priddy, Exhibit "A" of 
Appellant's answer opposing Appellee's motion for summary judgment 
and Addendum F to Appellant's Brief. 
i. All of the employees of the Appellee witnessed the 
accusation of retail theft. 
j. Ms. Priddy witnessed and heard the accusation of retail 
theft. See Affidavit of Jolene Priddy, Addendum F. 
k. Several shoppers either exiting or entering the store 
gathered around to view the spectacle. They heard the open, vocal 
and repeated accusations of retail theft or became aware of it as 
the Appellee's security operatives, namely Jackie Boysen, 
continued accusing the Appellant of retail theft and demanding to 
inspect the Appellant's and Ms. Priddy's shopping bags. 
1. During discovery, the Appellant purchased from the 
Appellee a video tape featuring the Appellant shopping in the 
7 
Appellee's store. See Shopko Video Tape, Exhibit "B" of 
Appellant's answer and opposition to Appellee's motion to summary 
judgment in the trial court and Addendum I to Appellant's Brief. 
m. The video recording shows the Appellant for about 45 
minutes of normal shopping in the store. Nothing in the video 
suggests or even allows the reasonable inference that the 
Appellant did anything to warrant suspicion of retail theft. See 
Affidavit of Greg Markham, Exhibit "E" of Appellant's answer 
opposing Appellee's motion for summary Judgment, and Addendum G 
to Appellant's Brief. In the video recording, it is obvious that 
the Appellant was stopped and accused of retail theft because of 
his race and ethnic heritage. See Shopko Video Tape, Addendum I. 
n. Since being accused of retail theft, the Appellant has 
been unable to sleep well, and often has nightmares. 
o. Additionally, Appellant has been unable to feel at ease 
in any store. The reckless and outrageous occurrences of February 
28, 1993 make him feel that, because of his race, he may be a 
perpetual suspect in retail theft. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On review of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate 
court, reviewing the facts in a light most favorable to 
Appellant's cause of action, is free to reappraise the legal 
conclusions reached by the trial court. In this case, the trial 
court failed to assess the materiality or the disputed aspects of 
the facts the parties offered and to draw all reasonable 
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the 
8 
Appellant, the non-moving party. Specifically, the trial court, 
failed to review a material and critical piece of evidence which 
goes to the principal issues of probable cause and privilege. 
Additionally, the trial court selected just
 Qne of the disputed 
facts, and drew all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of 
the moving party. This presumption in favor of the moving party 
violates the generally accepted standards for summary judgment. 
The trial court applied the wrong legal standards or produced 
a deficient legal analysis in reaching its conclusions. Finally, 
the Appellant submits that Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-11-18 
bars the plaintiff's constitutional right to seek redress in Utah 




ON REVIEW OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE 
APPELLATE COURT, REVIEWING THE FACTS IN A LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO APPELLANT'S CAUSE OF ACTION, IS 
FREE TO REAPPRAISE THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS 
On review of a summary judgment, the losing party is entitled 
to have all the facts presented, and all inferences fairly arising 
from those facts considered in a light most favorable to the 
losing party's cause of action. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); King v. 
Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992); Hiqqins 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993); Katzenberqer 
v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 408 (Utah App. 1987). 
9 
Since disposition of a case on summary judgment precludes a 
trial on the merits, the appellate court must review the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the losing party. This means that 
the appellate court should affirm only where it appears there r ;e 
no genuine disputes of fact or wheref even according to the facts 
as contended by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Seare v. 
Univ. of Utah Sch. of Medicine; 882 P. 2d 67 3, 674 (Utah App. 
1994). 
The trial court is to be given no deference and only if the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (based on 
the facts as seen by the losing party) is summary judgment to be 
granted. The matter is reviewed for correctness. Ferree v. 
State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); Seare v. Univ. of Utah Sch. 
of Medicine, 882 P.2d at 674; Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow 
Irrigation, Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); Mumford v. ITT 
Commercial Fin. Co., 858 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah App. 1993). 
a. The Trial Court Faced Several Material Factual Disputes 
1. Material Fact that a Non-Shopko Bag. 
"In determining whether the trial court properly found there 
were no genuine issues of material fact," the appellate court 
reviews "the facts in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, while giving no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions." Lister v. Utah Valley Community College, 247 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12, 14 (Utah App. 1994)(citing Promark Group, Inc. v. 
10 
Harris Corp. , 860 P.2d 964, 966 (Utah App. 1993); Ferree v. 
State; 784 P.2d at 151. 
A "party moving for summary judgment must establish a right 
to judgment based on the applicable law as applied to an 
undisputed material issue of fact. A party opposing the motion is 
required only to show that there is a material issue of fact.11 
Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 652 (Utah App. 1994) 
(citing Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). Utah 
Court of Appeals' emphasis. 
In this case, several issues of disputed fact exist. The 
materiality of those facts, and the fact that the Appellee did not 
deserve judgment as a matter of law, warranted a trial on the 
merits. The first disputed issue the trial court faced was 
whether the fact the Appellant and Ms. Priddy brought a non-Shopko 
bag into the Appellee's store provided a reasonable basis for the 
Appellee to suspect the Appellant of retail theft. See 
Transcript [Addendum H], Page 5, lines 4-7. In rebuttal, the 
Appellant argued that as a matter of custom, tradition or usage in 
shopping in malls featuring multiple stores, the fact that the 
Appellant or Ms. Priddy had a non-Shopko bag was not at all 
unusual. Shoppers go from one store to another, buying from 
different stores and carrying different stores' bags in and out of 
neighboring and/or adjacent stores. See Transcript, Page 14, line 
4-10. 
The trial court emphasized the fact the Appellant and/or Ms. 
Priddy had a foreign bag in their possession when the Appellant 
and Ms. Priddy entered the Appellee's store. The trial court 
11 
found reasonable grounds for the Appellee's conduct based on this 
fact. See Transcript, Page 14, line 11-13. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court 
failed to take into consideration that, as a matter of custom, 
tradition or usage, shoppers wander from store to store with bags 
of differ^t stores and the non-Shopko bag should not be construed 
as a rease aable ground for an accusation or even suspicion of 
retail theft. 
Consequently, Appellant further respectfully submits, the 
act that the Appellant and/or Ms. Priddy had a non-Shopko bag in 
their possession creates a material factual dispute whether the 
Appellee could find a reasonable ground to suspect the Appellant 
of shoplifting and probable cause to accuse him of a criminal act. 
Reasonable minds may differ on this issue because of the way 
people shop in malls featuring multi-stores. "No deference is 
accorded to the trial court's conclusions that the facts are not 
in dispute nor the court's legal conclusions based on those 
facts." Record v. Briqqs, P.2d , 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 
63, 66 (Utah App. 1994); Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 
P.2d 376, 378 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Kitchen v. Cal. Gas Co., 821 
P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 
1994). 
"[A] genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the 
facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ" on any 
material issue. Jackson v. Babney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
If this honorable Court finds "a material factual issue," exists, 
it "must reverse the grant of summary judgment." Pratt, 860 P.2d 
12 
at 378; K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 254 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 
1994) (citing Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County, 885 P.2d 231 at 
235)(summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues 
of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law). 
2. The Material Fact that the Exchange Was Made at the 
Service Desk. 
The most important feature in the Appellee's presentation and 
defense was that it acted reasonably because Ms. Priddy did not 
stop at the checkout counter with the curlers but went directly to 
the service desk to make the exchange. See Transcript, Page 5, 
lines 8-14. 
This fact is important because the modus operandi of the 
store comes into sharp dispute. In his original complaint, 
Addendum D at H 6, the Appellant alleged that the Appellee issued 
a rain check, and informed Ms. Priddy that she could keep the 
defective merchandise and to come back at a later date with the 
defective merchandise to exchange it for a good set. This 
important fact was again highlighted for the benefit of the trial 
court in the Appellant's answer opposing the motion for summary 
judgment. Addendum E at Page 2, 4th paragraph. At oral 
argument, again the Appellant's counsel amplified that fact. See 
Transcript, Page 15, lines 17-25. 
The following verbal exchange at the oral argument 
illustrates that the trial court was well-informed of the 
Appellee's merchandise exchange procedures. 
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Judge Young: All right. Now they then had the old 
curlers in a bag. 
Mr. de Montreux: Not in a bag—The old curlers were 
in a bag, yes. 
Judge Young: They took the new curlers in their 
hand— 
Mr. de Montreux: Yes. 
Judge Young: —Walked through the counter, 
through the checkout counter and 
went then to the service desk. 
Mr. de Montreux: As they were instructed to do. 
Judge Young: Well, as they would have been 
expected to do, likely. 
Transcript, Page 15, lines 13-25. (Emphasis supplied) 
Here, the Appellee's procedures in effectuating exchanges of 
merchandise were at issue. Recognizing the materiality of the 
fact that Ms. Priddy did not stop at the checkout counter, the 
trial court made the following observation to the Appellee's 
lawyer: 
Judge Young: Okay. Now let me just take it one step 
further. Shouldn't I require this matter 
than go to a jury to decide whether that 
action formed an adequate basis for the 
employer, or the merchant, to believe 
reasonably that merchandise was being 
wrongfully taken. Transcript, Page 25, 
lines 20-25. 
The fact that Ms. Priddy went directly to the service desk 
was crucial and disputed. The trial court saw this fact's 
materiality and knew it was disputed. The trial court should 
have drawn all reasonable inferences from the dispute in a 
light most favorable to the Appellant. Nonetheless, the 
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trial court relied upon this factual dispute as the only grounds 
for finding the Appellee acted reasonably in accusing the 
Appellant of retail theft. See Transcript at Page 29, lines 5-15. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court 
should have found that the Appellee's merchandise exchange 
procedures were a disputed factual matter which subsequently put 
into question the reasonableness of the accusation of retail theft 
or probable cause for its utterance. At trial, Ms. Priddy and 
others would have testified that Ms. Priddy acted according to 
Appellee's instructions and according to the store's own rules. 
Because this material factual dispute existed at the time of 
summary judgment, it should have been submitted to a jury. 
Butf the trial court did not see a genuine issue of material 
fact here and ordered summary judgment. And if it saw an issue of 
material fact, the trial court wrongly drew all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the moving party. The 
trial court's position was erroneous and should be reversed. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Republic 
Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1994). 
3. The Material Occurrences Which Took Place in 
Appellee's Parking Lot. 
Another disputed and material fact was the nature of the 
accusations made to the Appellant by the Appellee's security 
operatives. The Appellee argued that the it approached the 
Appellant and Ms. Priddy as they left the store. The Appellee 
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claims that the leader, Ms. Jackie Boysen, wanted to look in Ms. 
Priddy's bags. See Transcript, Page 5, lines 15-19. This fact is 
disputed. 
The Appellant alleged that the Appellee's security operatives 
stopped him in the parking lot and accused him of retail theft. 
(Complaint, Addendum D at U 10. See also Affidavit of Jolene 
Priddyf Exhibit A to the Appellant's answer opposing the motion 
for summary judgment, and Addendum F hereto.) In Ms. Priddy's 
sworn statement, she clearly testifies that the Appellee accused 
the Appellant of retail theft and then requested to check 
Appellant's bags. Addendum F at f 7. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that Ms. Priddy's 
testimony goes to her credibility as a witness and is an issue for 
trial. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 
681 P.2d 1258f 1261 (Utah 1984) (trial court must not weigh 
evidence or assess credibility). Furthermore, "[o]ne sworn 
statement under oath [involving a material fact] is all that is 
necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary 
judgment." Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 378 
(Utah App. 1993) (citing Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 
950, 957 (Utah App. 1989). This reviewing court should accept Ms. 
Priddy's sworn statement as true. K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 254 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1994)(citing Wineqar v. Froerer Corp., 
813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court faced 
two parties with very different stories. The presence of a 
dispute as to material facts prohibits the granting of summary 
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judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abotty 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 
1977). See also, Billings ex rel. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. 
Co., 8i9 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991)(summary judgment proper only if the 
pleadingsf depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law); cf. Fashion 
Place Inv. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County Mental 
Health, 776 P.2d 941, 943f cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1989)([if extrinsic evidence] is disputed, then a material fact is 
also disputed, and summary judgment cannot be granted). 
When granting a motion for summary judgment, a trial judge 
must consider each element of the claim under the appropriate 
standard of proof. Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 885 
P.2d 285, 288 (Utah App. 1994). The trial court ignored most of 
the disputed facts7 and selected only the walk to the service desk 
as a factual dispute.8 From this fact alone, the trial court drew 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the moving party in 
violation of the standards for summary judgment. Promark Group, 
Inc. v. Harris Corp., 860 P.2d 964, 966 (Utah App. 1993); Lister 
v. Utah Valley Community College, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 14 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
7
. The trial court did not see the occurrences in the parking lot as 
material. It simply blamed the Appellant for being belligerent. See 
Transcript, Page 29, lines 4-15. Is that not weighing the evidence. 
8
. Actually, neither of the parties relied upon the fact that Ms. Priddy 
went to service desk without stopping at the checkout counter because that was 
the Appellee's procedure. It is the trial court who magnified this issue. 
The parties' issue was whether or not the Appellee committed slander per se in 
accusing the Appellant of retail theft in the parking lot. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO REVIEW ALL THE EVIDENCE 
When granting a motion for summary judgment, a trial judge 
must consider each element of the claim under the appropriate 
standard of proof. Andelex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 
1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door 
Corp., 885 P.2d 285, 288 (Utah App. 1994). 
Most crucial to the Appellant's case in the trial court was 
the video recording which the Appellant submitted as Exhibit B to 
Appellant's answer opposing the motion for summary judgment, 
(Addendum I on appeal). The recording shows that the Appellee 
acted with recklessly and with malice and that the Appellee 
targeted the Appellant and accused him of retail theft because of 
his race. Regrettably, the trial court did NOT review the 
recording and, therefore, could not see that the Appellee had no 
probable cause and lost its statutory privilege to stop the 
Appellant. 
To illustrate the trial court's ignorance of the video tape 
recording, please consider this excerpt from the transcript of 
oral argument on the motion for summary judgment. At page 16, 
lines 14-17, counsel for the Appellant, assuming that the trial 
court had fully reviewed the evidence, called the trial court's 
attention to the content of the video tape recording: 
Mr. de Montreux: [Your Honor, that is true.] However, 
when you got the entire evidence, when 
you look at the evidence of the video 
tape— 
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Here, the trial court interrupted Appellant's counsel and 
asked: 
Judge Young: The what? 
Transcript, Page 16, lines 14-17. 
Further showing the trial court did not review the recording 
to assess its implication is this additional excerpt from the 
transcript of the oral argument: 
Judge Young: Let me ask you this. Suppose, given all9 
of their evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, if it is true that 
the store had observed him by video tape for 45 minutes, 
and the videotape does not show any activity that would 
be akin to shoplifting, what reasonable basis is there, 
as the statute requires, is there that would allow the 
employees to conclude that there had been the potential 
of shoplifting? Just the walking through the counter? 
Transcript. Page 25, lines 8-17 (Emphasis supplied) 
The Appellant respectfully submits that it is clear the trial 
court did not have any knowledge of the content of the video 
recording and therefore could not assess its importance regarding 
the significant issues of privilege and probable cause. The trial 
court was surprised by the reference to the recording. Had the 
trial court reviewed the video tape, it would have discovered 
that, from the instant the Appellant entered the Appellee's store, 
he became a suspect of retail theft. The trial court would have 
discovered that the Appellant became the focus of a store-wide 
9
. It is ironic that the trial court recognized that "all" the evidence 
must be viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant and still based its 
conclusions on just the fact that Ms. Priddy walked through the checkout 
counter to the service desk. 
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manhunt involving all security operatives working for the 
Appellee, including the Appellee's loss prevention supervisor, 
Jackie" Boysen. The trial court would have discovered that the 
surveillance cameras in the store targeted every move the 
Appellant made, focusing, zooming and moving to wide angle to 
better scrutinize the Appellant's actions. The trial court would 
have found that the store security operatives even ignored Ms. 
Priddy and remained focused on the Appellant. The trial court 
would have found out that the store security operatives did not 
pay any scrutiny whatsoever to other shoppers who were Caucasian, 
but remained focused on the Appellant as a suspect:. The trial 
court would have discovered that, at the checkout counter, 
everything was done legitimately. It would have been able to see 
that Ms. Priddy returned to the checkout counter from the service 
desk which is located just behind the checkout counter after the 
exchange; that the new curlers were in the open and that Ms. 
Priddy offered to have the checkout clerk verify that everything 
was proper. The trial court would also have discovered that 
Ja<~'~4e Boysen, the first security operative to accuse the 
Appellant of retail theft was the very same person in charge of 
loss prevention and that she directed both the camera surveillance 
and the floor surveillance of the Appellant.10 
In a motion for summary judgment the non-moving party is 
entitled to all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the 
10
. Appellant's motion to compel wanted the Appellees to provide the 
identity of the person(s) who operated, the surveillance cameras. The Appellee 
refused to provide that information and instead filed its motion for summary 
judgment. Deposition of the cameras' operators would have established who 
ordered the surveillance of the Appellant. 
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facts of the case, together with the evidence. Utah R.Civ.P 56(c); 
Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County, 885 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993); Seare 
v. Univ. of Utah Sch. of Medicine, 882 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah App. 
1994). The trial court is required to consider each element of 
the claim and every disputed fact under the appropriate standard 
of proof. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 
(Utah App. 1994)(Utah App. 1994). 
Had the trial court reviewed and considered all the evidence 
in its analysis as it was supposed to do, Id., it would have been 
able to follow the standards of this appellate court. 
Unfortunately, that just did not happen. The Appellant 
respectfully submits that this Court has the authority to review 
the entire matter de novo and in a light most favorable to the 
Appellant. Briqqs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). 
Ill 
THE APPELLEE LOST ITS QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE 
IN ACTING RECKLESSLY OR WITH MALICE.11 
"Summary judgment allows the parties to pierce the pleadings 
to determine whether a material issue of fact exists that must be 
resolved by the fact finder." Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.,. 869 
P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993)(citing Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 770 (Utah 1984); Webster v. Sill, 675 
P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983)). 
In defending its defamatory actions, the Appellee invoked the 
doctrine of conditional or qualified privilege. Merchants 
11
. The Appellant made this very same argument in his Answer and 
Opposition to the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment in the court below. 
See Addendum E at Page 10, Argument IV. 
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traditionally rely upon this privilege when detaining suspected 
thieves. See Transcript, Page 8, lines 20-24. The Appellant 
concedes that the law allows this privilege. See generally 
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc. 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991).12 However, 
the Appellant respectfully submits that there is a magnificent 
distinction between the Appellee's conditional or qualified 
privilege and absolute privilege. The Appellee's privilege is 
subject to attacks and can be defeated. Williams v. Standard 
Examiner Publishing Co., 27 P.2d 1, 13-14 (Utah 1933)(defendant 
privilege merely raises a prima facie presumption in favor of the 
Defendant). 
In order for a publication to be conditionally privileged, 
there must be present a situation warranting a privilege and the 
use of the privilege in good faith and without express malice. 
Atlas Sewing Centers v. Nat'1 Ass'n of Indep. Sewing Mach. 
Dealers, 260 F.2d 803, 808 (10th Cir. 1958). 
Applying the above law to the instant case, the Appellant 
respectfully submits that the evidence shows that the only reason 
he was a suspect of retail theft on February 28, 1993, is because 
of his race and his ethnicity. 
The Appellee targeted the Appellant as a suspect the instant 
the Appellant entered the Appellee's store. See Shopko Video, 
Addendum I The Appellee followed the Appellant, trained its 
cameras on the Appellant wherever the Appellant went in the store 
while shopping. See Shopko Video, Addendum I. The Appellee did 
not train its cameras on Ms. Priddy who is Caucasian. The 
12
. c.f. U.C.A. 76-9-506 (1990 as amended). 
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Appellee did not train its cameras on other Caucasian shoppers 
who, just like the Appellant, were calmly shopping. The 
Appellant' s race is not and cannot be probable cause to warrant 
suspicion of retail theft, or the public and slanderous accusation 
of a criminal offense. 
The video clearly shows that there was no probable cause to 
warrant suspicion of shoplifting. Therefore, Appellee's acts 
constitute violation of the Appellant's civil rights, and express 
malice or recklessness. This malice or recklessness defeats 
the Appellee's conditional or qualified privilege. Atlas Sewing 
Centers, supra. See also Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc. 626 P.2d 969, 
972 (Utah 1981) (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 
(1968). The Thompson Court held: 
[R]eckless conduct (or malice) is not measured by 
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, 
or would have investigated before publishing. There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion 
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as 
to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such 
doubts shows reckless for the truth or falsity and 
demonstrates actual malice. 
The video tape clearly shows that the Appellee did not have 
any reasonable ground to stop and accuse the Appellant of retail 
theft. See Affidavit of Greg Markham, Addendum G. The 
Appellee's defamatory accusation was flagrantly based on race and 
race only, as the video tape shows nothing to arouse Appellee's 
suspicion. The Appellee acted from an improper motive, from a 
desire to do harm, knowing that its statements were not true and 
could not be proven. See Ogden Bus Lines v. KSLf Inc. 551 P.2d 
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222, 225 (Utah 1976). The Appellee's actions constitute actual 
malice. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the general view is 
that the Appellee must have an actual and honest belief in the 
truth of the defamatory matter in order to be protected by a 
conditional privilege. Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 819 (Utah 
1958) (conditional privilege will not be recognized if the 
Defendant knows that his statements are unfounded). The 
requirement of good faith does not only apply to professional news 
organizations. Direct Import Buyers Ass'n v. KSL, Inc.,, 572 P.2d 
692, 694 (Utah 1977), it exists as well for private individuals. 
Moench, 331 P.2d at 819. 
Even in cases dealing with shopkeepers1 statutory immunity, 
Utah courts recognize the duty of shopkeepers to have probable 
cause before arresting, or as in this case, accusing a person of a 
crime. In Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 
on rehearing 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that in determining reasonableness of detention and arrest of 
suspected shoplifters for purposes of statutory immunity from 
civil suits, the applicable test is one that is practical under 
the circumstances, i.e., "whether a reasonable and prudent man in 
his position would be justified in believing facts which would 
warrant arrest." Id. at 320-321; Isaiah v. Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co. , 174 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio App. 1959). 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the Appellee's 
security operatives focused on his actions in the Appellee's store 
for about 45 minutes. During that time, the Appellant did not do 
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anything to warrant suspicion. The Appellant did not leave the 
floor until he existed the store. Nothing on the tape shows even 
an inference of improper behavior. Any reasonable and prudent 
person would have known that there was no reasonable basis to 
accuse the Appellant of retail theft. Terry, 605 P.2d at 320-321. 
The Terry case also held that to obtain statutory immunity 
from civil suits arising out of detention and arrest of suspected 
shopliftersf the officer or merchant must allege and prove not 
only that he believed in good faith that his conduct was lawful, 
but also that his belief was reasonable. Id. at 320. (Emphasis 
supplied). 
Without viewing the video recording which was the principal 
evidence regarding the question of Appellee's claimed privilege, 
the Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court 
erroneously ruled that the Appellee had a reasonable basis to 
accuse the Appellant of retail theft. The trial court erred in 
holding that, just because Ms. Priddy went to exchange the hair 
curlers as she was instructed, the Appellee had a reasonable basis 
to accuse the Appellant of retail theft. See Transcript, Page 
29, lines 1-19. 
a. When Facing a Mixed Question of Fact and Law, 
a Jury, not the Trial Court, should Decide the 
Outcome. 
The Appellant further respectfully submits that this Court 
should reversed the findings of the trial court for failure to 
review the evidence and for failure to send the case to a jury 
because of the presence of a mixed question of law and fact. 
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When reasonableness and probable cause are disputed, a trial 
court faces a mixed question of law and fact. If the question of 
fact is undisputed, the trial court faces only a question of law 
that it should determine. But, as in this case, if reasonableness 
and probable cause are in dispute, the trial court is required to 
send the case to a jury to decide which story to believe. Then 
the trial court instructs the jury regarding the law to apply to 
the facts. However, in this case, faced disputed facts as to the 
reasonableness and the probable cause issues, the trial court 
regrettably only saw a question of law. Terry v. Zions, 605 P.2d 
at 320, n. 15.13 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD OR 
PRODUCED AN INCOMPLETE OR DEFICIENT LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Appellant sued the Appellee for slander. The Appellant 
alleged that the Appellee made a slander per se in accusing him of 
13
. Footnote 15 reads as follows: "The standard is generally stated as 2 
"The question of probable cause is a mixed one of law 
and fact. The court submits the evidence offered to 
the jury with instructions as to what will amount to 
probable cause if proved. If the facts are 
undisputed, the question is one of law to be 
determined by the court." 22 Am.Jur., False 
Imprisonment, Section 218, p. 429. Under this 
standard if the question of reasonable or probable 
cause for the detention of a customer is undisputed, 
it is only one of law for the court, but if the 
evidence is conflicting, it is a mixed question of law 
and fact in which the trier of fact must determine 
which of the conflicting stories is true and the judge 
must decide whether this story satisfies the 
requirements of reasonable cause. See Stienbaugh v. 
Payless Drug Stores, Inc., 75 N.M. 118, 401 P.2d 104 
(1965); Lukas v. J.C. Penny Corp. 233 Or. 345, 378 
P.2d 717 (1963) . 
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retail theft in public. The only statute the trial court used in 
ruling against the Appellant provides: 
Any merchant who has reason to believe that 
merchandise has been wrongfully taken by an 
individual contrary to Section 78-11-15 Or 78-11-16 
and that he can recover such merchandise by taking 
such individual into custody and detaining him may, 
for the purpose of attempting to effect such 
recovery or for the purpose of informing a peace 
officer of the circumstances of such detention, 
take the individual into custody and detain him in 
a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of 
time. Such taking into custody and detention by a 
merchant or his employee shall not render such 
merchant or his employee criminally or civilly 
liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, 
slander or unlawful detention or for any type of 
claim or action unless the custody and detention 
are unreasonable under all circumstances. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-11-18 (1975 as amended). 
Apparently, the statute gives merchants the authority to 
request a suspected shoplifter to stop or to be detained for a 
reasonable period of time. However, in this case, the Appellant 
was not invited to participate in an investigation. The 
Appellee's security operatives abruptly accused the Appellant of 
retail theft in a public parking lot in full view of Ms. Priddy 
and other customers. The Appellee is a merchant. U.C.A. 78-11-18 
(1975 as amended) only gives it a conditional privilege to act 
reasonably in detaining a suspect, but not to openly vilify the 
Appellant as it did. 
Therefore, the Appellant respectfully submits that the trial 
court's ruling [Transcript Page 29, lines 4-15] that the Appellee 
acted reasonably is deficient. The trial court faced a mixed 
question of fact and law. The principal facts of reasonableness 
27 
and probable cause were disputed. The trial court was required to 
submit the dispute to a jury to determine the truthfulness of the 
stories.14 
The Appellant also respectfully submits that the trial court 
faced a defamation of character issue in which a witness, Ms. 
Priddy, submitted a sworn statement that the Appellee slandered 
the Appellant.15 This presented an issue of fact for a jury to 
decide. The trial court did not consider the implication of the 
slander issue or the disputed testimony in granting summary 
judgment. This, the Appellant submits, amounts to the trial court 
rendering a deficient legal analysis which failed to take into 
a ^ount every element of the case. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. 
Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994) 
V 
U.C.A. 78-11-18 BARS THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO OPEN COURT 
IN VIOLATION OF ART. 1, § 11 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
Utah Code Annotated 78-11-18 (1975 as amended). Merchant's 
authority to detain. 
Any merchant who has reason to believe that 
merchandise has been wrongfully taken by an 
individual contrary to Section 78-11-15 Or 78-
11-16 and that he can recover such merchandise 
by taking such individual into custody and 
detaining him may, for the purpose of 
attempting to effect such recovery or for the 
purpose of informing a peace officer of the 
circumstances of such detention, take the 
14
. See Footnote 13, supra, and accompanying text. 
15
. "[o]ne sworn statement under oath [involving a material fact] is all 
that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary 
judgment." Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 378 Utah Ct.App. 
1993)(quoting Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 
1989)) . 
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individual into custody and detain him in a 
reasonable manner and for a reasonable length 
of time. Such taking into custody and 
detention by a merchant or his employee shall 
not render such merchant or his employee 
criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, 
false imprisonment, slander or unlawful 
detention or for any type of claim or action 
unless the custody and detention are 
unreasonable under all circumstances. 
Utah State Constitution. Article I, Section 11. Courts Open 
— Redress of injuries. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for any injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party. 
The trial court's ruling, meaning to rely upon U.C.A. §§ 77-
11-17 and 18,16 but instead cited to U.C.A. §§ 78-12-17, 18, found 
that Utah law gives a merchant the privilege to detain a customer 
suspected of shoplifting. However, as interpreted by the trial 
court, the statute allows a merchant an absolute privilege to 
indiscriminately detain people and not be amenable to a court of 
law, even when the merchant has no probable cause to act. The 
Appellant respectfully submits that the merchant immunity statute 
and the interpretation it invites, operates to keep the courts 
closed to aggrieved individuals. Article 1, Section 11 places a 
limitation upon the Legislature to prevent that branch of state 
government from closing the doors of the courts to a person who 
has a legal right which is enforceable. The Appellant was injured 
. See Transcript Page 29, lines 4-5. 
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by the Appellee and sought relief. The statute stood as a bar 
against him and his claims. Utah State Const. Article 1, Section 
11; See generally Brown v. Wiqhtman, 151 P. 366 (Utah 1915). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed reversible error in failing assess 
the materiality of the disputed facts and to draw all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the Appellant, the non-
moving party. The trial court DID NOT review the video which was 
the most important piece of evidence the Appellant provided. Thus 
the trial court could not assess the disputed issues of 
reasonableness and probable cause or draw any inferences from the 
evidence. Because of the errors highlighted above, and based on 
other points argued in this brief, this case should be remanded 
for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of January 1995. 
M O N T R E U X F R E R E S , P . C . 
Bel-Ami JeanNde Montc^ux / 
Attorney for Appellant / 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that, on January 10, 1995, I caused to be 
hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the following: 
Royal I. Hansen, Esq. 
H. Dennis Piercy 
Moyle & Draper, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
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ADDENDUM A 
T r i a l c o u r t ' s F i n a l O r d e r 
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Royal I. Hansen (#1346), and 
H. Dennis Piercey (#3746), of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Uvalko ShopKo Stores, Inc. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
Telephone: (801) 521-0250 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PRIDDY, : 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
v. : 
SHOPKO CORPORATION, : Civil No. 930905722 CV 
Defendant. : Judge David S. Young 
Uvalko ShopKo Stores, Inc.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment came on regularly for hearing on August 5, 1994, before 
the Honorable David S. Young. Plaintiff John Priddy was 
represented by Bel-Ami De Montreux, Esq. of Montreux Freres, P.C. 
Defendant Uvalko ShopKo Stores, Inc. was represented by Royal I. 
Hansen and H. Dennis Piercey of Moyle & Draper, P.C. Based upon 
the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated July 12, 1994, 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated July 
12, 1994, Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated August 1, 1994, Objection and Response to 
Plaintiff's "Notice of Additional Authority," dated August 3, 
1994, together with the statements of counsel, the contents of 
the file, and being fully advised as to the premises, and good 
cause appearing, now, therefor, it is 
ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED: 
1. Uvalko ShopKo Stores, Inc.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted; 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action 
therein, is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action, 
defendant is awarded its costs, the amount of which are to be 
inserted herein by the Clerk pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(e) 
when taxed or ascertained (costs: $ ) , and this 
action is dismissed. 
DATED: August , 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
By 
Honorable David S. Young 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
MONTREUX FRERES, P.C. 
by 
Bel-Ami De Montreux 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
H. Dennis Piercey 
Attorneys for Uvalko ShopKo Stores, Inc. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on August F? . 1994, I hand-delivered a 
copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order to the following: 
Bel-Ami De Montreux, Esq. 
MONTREUX FRERES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM B 
N o t i c e o f A p p e a l 
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BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX, # 6207 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX LAW OFFICES 
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (801) 322-3021 
FAX NUMBER (801) 359-7406 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF /APPELLANT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PRIDDY, J 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, ; 
VS. ! 
SHOPKO CORPORATION, : 
DEFENDANT / APPELLE . ; 
: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
: CIVIL NO. 930905722 CV 
\ JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff/Appellant, John Priddy, by and 
through his attorney of record, Bel-Ami de Montreux, and appeals 
to the Utah Supreme Court from the summary judgment order entered 
by the trial court on August 5, 1994. 
DATED this 24th day of August, 1994. 
M O N T R E U X L A W O F F I C E S 
Bel-Ami de Montreux 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
1 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that on August 24, 1994 
correct copy of the foregoing tor 
Royal I. Hansenf Esq. 
Moyle & Draper 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s A s s i g n m e n t 
24 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
October 12, 1994 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
BelaAmi DeMontreux 
DeMontreux, BelAmi 
Attorney at Law 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
John Priddy, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. No. 940413 
Shopko Corporation, 930905722CV 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court, this case 
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to 
that Court. The address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
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ft s 
B E L - A M I DE MONTREUX, # 6 2 0 7 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX F R E R E S , P . C . 
310 SOUTH M A I N , TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 3 2 2 - 3 0 2 1 
FAX NUMBER ( 8 0 1 ) 3 5 9 - 7 4 0 6 
ATTORNEY FOR P L A I N T I F F 
•\ • - *M ' J J 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PRIDDY, 
V S . 
P L A I N T I F F , 
SHOPKO CORPORATION , 
DEFENDANT. 
V E R I F I E D COMPLAIHT 
CIVIL m.^s696S7Z^CV 
JUDGE DAVin S.YOUNG 
The Plaintiff in this matter, John Priddy, by and through his 
attorney of record, Bel-Ami de Montreux, complains of the 
Defendant, Shopko Corp., and alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. The Plaintiff is an individual residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
2. The Defendant is believed to be a Wisconsin Corporation 
that is authorized to do business in the State of Utah by virtue 
of the laws of the State of Utah. 
4. In Addition to U.C.A. 78-27-24 (Long Arm Statute), 
jurisdiction is invoked as follows: 
(a) Article 1, Section 1 of the CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
(Inherent and inalienable right to protect against wrongs and 
petition for redress and grievance) 
00002 
(b) Article I Section 11 of the CONSTITUTION OF UTAH (Courts 
Open—Redress of Injuries); and 
(c) The common law of Utah 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. On Sunday, February 28, 1993, the Plaintiff and his 
fiancee, Ms. Jolene Patience, went to the Shopko Store located in 
Sugarhouse, Salt Lake City, to return a set of defective hair 
rollers that Ms. Patience had purchased from Shopko on February 
20, 1993. The set of rollers was missing a few pins. 
6. Ms. Patience had attempted to return the defective hair 
rollers to the store before, on February 20, 1993. The store was 
out of the brand. Therefore, the store's return clerk had told 
Ms. Patience to go on using the hair rollers until the store 
received a new shipment. The Store gave Ms. Patience the 
appropriate rain check paper to execute the exchange. (See 
Exhibit "A" featuring all relevant store receipts) 
7. On February 28, 1993, the Plaintiff and Ms. Patience 
entered the Shopko store to exchange the rollers and purchase a 
few household items. 
8. While shopping, the Plaintiff and his companion went to 
the area where the Defendant kept the hair rollers, and got a new 
set. 
9. Thereafter the Plaintiff selected a few household items 
and went to the cashier to pay for the household items while Ms. 
Patience went to the Customer Service/Return Desk to effectuate 
the exchange of rollers. 
00003 
2MP/9213-CI7-PRIDDI 1 
10. Upon paying for the purchase, the Plaintiff and Ms. 
Patience walked out of the Defendant's store where the Defendant's 
employees and/or agents surrounded the Plaintiff and loudly 
accused the Plaintiff of shoplifting. 
11. The Defendant did not have probable cause to stop and 
retain the Plaintiff. The Defendant's only cause for retaining 
the Plaintiff was the fact that the Plaintiff was an African-
American. The Defendant apparently assumed that the Plaintiff 
must have been a shoplifter because of his race. 
12. The Plaintiff was not only harassed, but he was 
ridiculed and humiliated before his companion. The Plaintiff was 
held to public scorn because the Defendant's employees and agents 
made him look like a common criminal in arresting him and in 
accusing him of stealing the Defendant's goods before all the 
other customers leaving and entering the Defendant's store at the 
time of the occurrences. 
13. All of the Defendant's accusations and all of the 
Defendant's collateral statements were untrue, libelous and 
damaging. 
14. The Defendant assassinated the Plaintiff's character and 
reputation. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER) 
15. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs one 
(1) through 14, the same as if fully set forth herein. 
16. The Plaintiff was a legitimate shopper who paid valuable 
consideration to the Defendant. 
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17. The Plaintiff was an invitee to whom the Defendant owed 
a higher degree of care and the Defendant lacked probable cause to 
retain the Plaintiff except that the Defendant assumed the 
Plaintiff was shoplifting because the Plaintiff is Black. 
18. The Defendant's humiliating accusations, arrest and 
ensuing public character assassination of the Plaintiff were made 
willfully, wantonly and maliciously and in a discriminatory 
fashion in order to injure, ridicule, embarrass and humiliate the 
Plaintiff before his companion and the general public. 
19. At all times mentioned, the Defendant Corporation had 
knowledge of, authorized, and ratified the mentioned willful, 
wanton, discriminatory and malicious statements made by the 
Defendant's agents and employees. This is true because the 
Defendant failed to adequately train its employees and agents and 
authorized such illegal acts from its employees and agents. 
20. As a direct result of the wanton, malicious and false 
statements, the Plaintiff's former excellent character is 
sabo+^ged. 
4L1. AS a direct and proximate result of the slander 
.mmitted by Defendant Corporation's agents and employees, 
Plaintiff has sustained special damages. The Court should award 
to the Plaintiff damages in the amount of $55 0,000.00 or an 
approximate amount to be established at the time of trial as a 
warning to the Defendant and others that society does not 
countenance their egregious behavior. 
00005 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL D I S T R E S S ) 
22. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs one 
(1) through 21, the same as if fully set forth herein. 
23. The Defendant by and through its employees and/or agents 
recklessly and negligently caused severe emotional distress to the 
Plaintiff. 
24. As a result of the Defendant's employees and/or agents' 
treatment of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has had to suffer 
emotionally as he were left facing extreme humiliation while being 
held to public scorn in a situation where the Defendant did not 
have probable cause but decided to abuse and ridicule the 
Plaintiff merely because of his race. 
25. The manner in which the Defendant's employees and/or 
agents with the conspiracy or connivance or under the influence of 
Defendant Shopko Corporation handled Plaintiff's misfortune—a 
misfortune which they caused—was reckless, negligent, extreme and 
outrageous, the actors knew or should have known that such conduct 
would and has caused the Plaintiff mental anguish and suffering, 
humiliation and embarrassment. 
26. The Plaintiffs' mental anguish and suffering, 
humiliation and embarrassment are justified under the 
circumstances, and further, because, aside from having to face 
public scorn and ridicule, the Plaintiff has had to endure and is 




27. As a direct and proximate result of the slander and/or 
libel committed by Defendant Corporation's agents and employees, 
the Plaintiff has suffered extreme humiliation and embarrassment 
for which the Plaintiff is entitled to recover general damages in 
the amount of $2,000,000.00, or a proximate amount to be 
established at the time of trial. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests judgment against the 
Defendant as follows: 
1. Trial by Jury; 
2. Plaintiff should recover from Defendant as to the first 
cause of action, damages in the amount of $550,000.00; 
3. As to the second cause of action, Plaintiff should 
recover from the Defendant damages in the amount of $2,000,000.00; 
4. The Court should award Plaintiff all reasonable attorney 
fees and court costs incurred herein; and 
5. The Court should award Plaintiff such other and further 
relief which it deems just and proper. 
DATED this ^ -\, day of "-September, 1993. 
MONTREUX FRERES, P.C. 
MA A , A 
BEL-A#1 'DE MONTREUX 
ATTORNEY FOR ^ILAINTIEF 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
John Priddy, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and says that he is the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter; 
that he has read the foregoing Complaint, and understands the 
contents thereof, and the same is true of his own knowledge, 
information and belief. 




310 South Main. Suit* 308 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
My Commission Expires 
March 19. 1996 
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BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX, # 6 2 0 7 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX LAW OFFICES 
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (801) 322-3021 
FAX NUMBER (801) 359-7406 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 







ANSWER AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 930905722 CV 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
The P l a i n t i f f i n t h i s mat ter , John Pr iddy , by and through h i s 
a t t o r n e y of r e c o r d , Bel-Ami de Montreux, r e s p e c t f u l l y submits t h i s 
Memorandum of P o i n t s and A u t h o r i t i e s as Answer and i n O p p o s i t i o n 
t o t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s , Shopko C o r p o r a t i o n , Mot ion f o r Summary 
Judgment . T h i s Memorandum i s s u p p o r t e d by A f f i d a v i t s o f 
w i t n e s s e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e P l a i n t i f f ' s , and by t h e P l a i n t i f f ' s 
D e p o s i t i o n . 
INTRODUCTION 
(a) The Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment 
because this case presents controverted facts and issues 
warranting a trial on the merits. 
(b) The Defendant made defamatory statements amounting to 
slander per se in publicly accusing the Plaintiff of committing a 
criminal act; Retail Theft. The Defendant's defamatory statements 
were published in the parking lot of the Defendant's facilities 
and heard by other shoppers, including the Plaintiffs companion, 
See Affidavit of Jolene Priddy, Exhibit "A." Several other people 
also heard the defamatory statements. The Plaintiff suffered 
special damages as a matter of law. 
(c) The Defendant does not enjoy absolute immunity or 
privilege in this matter. The Defendant's privilege, if 
available, is a qualified or conditioned privilege. The 
Defendant's sole reason for accusing the Plaintiff of retail theft 
is based on the Plaintiff' s race; Black. As a matter of law, the 
Defendant's actions amount to express malice which defeats the 
Defendant's qualified immunity. 
(d) The Plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result of 
the Defendant's outrageous, recklessly discriminatory and 
intolerable conduct. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On or about February 20, 199^, Mrs. Jolene Patience—now 
known as Jolene Priddy—purchased a set of hair curlers 
(hereinafter "the set") from the Defendant Corporation's store 
located in Sugarhouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Shortly thereafter, because the set was defective, 
Jolene Priddy returned the set to the store. The store was out of 
similar merchandise. The store's customer service clerk gave 
Jolene Priddy a rain check document so she could make the exchange 
at another date. The clerk also told Jolene Priddy to keep the 
defective rollers until the exchange. 
3. On Sunday, February 28, 1993, The Plaintiff and Jolene 
Priddy, together, went to the Defendant's store to effectuate the 
exchange and to shop. 
4. At the store, the Plaintiff shopped around and selected 
a few household items he fully intended to pay for. The Plaintiff 
also helped Jolene Priddy select a replacement set (of hair 
curlers). 
5. After completing his shopping, the Plaintiff went to the 
cashier to pay for the household items while Jolene Priddy went to 
the Customer Service Desk to effectuate the exchange. 
6. Upon paying the cashier for the items, the Plaintiff and 
Jolene Priddy left the store. 
7. Several employees of the Defendant Corporation 
surrounded the Plaintiff and his companion in the Parking lot 
where one Ms. Jackie Boysen, the Defendant's loss prevention 
officer, loudly accused the Plaintiff of retail theft and demanded 
to inspect the shopping bags. See Affidavits of Jolene Priddy, 
Exhibit "A" & Affidavit of John Priddy, Exhibit "D." 
8. All of the employees of the Defendant Corporation 
witnessed the accusation of retail theft. 
9. Jolene Priddy witnessed the accusation of retail theft. 
See Affidavit of Jolene Priddy, Exhibit "A." 
10. Several shoppers either exiting or entering the store 
gathered around to view the spectacle. They heard the open, vocal 
and repeated accusation of retail theft or became aware of it as 
the Defendant's employees, namely Jackie Boysen, continued 
accusing the Plaintiff of retail theft and demanding to inspect 
the Plaintiff's and his companion's shopping bags. 
11. During discovery, the Defendant Corporation produced a 
video tape featuring the Plaintiff shopping in the Defendant's 
store. See Shopko video Tape, Exhibit "B." 
12. Nothing in the video suggests or even allows the 
reasonable inference that the Plaintiff did anything to warrant 
suspicion of retail theft. See Affidavit of Greg Markham, Exhibit 
"E." In fact, in the video, it is only obvious the Plaintiff was 
stopped and accused of retail theft because of his race and ethnic 
heritage. See Shopko Video Tape, Exhibit "B." 
13. The Plaintiff is a Black man. The Plaintiff is a 
professional and an executive affiliated with U.S. West 
Telecommunications. The Plaintiff does not have any criminal 
record. 
14. Since the incident, the Plaintiff has been unable to 
sleep well, often having nightmares. 
15. Since the incident, the Plaintiff has been unable to 
feel at ease in any store in the United States because the 
reckless and outrageous occurrences of February 28, 199J make him 




STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary Judgment is appropriate when the record shows "that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In determining whether 
there is an issue of material fact, we view all facts and draw all 
inferences from the fac t s in favor of the non-moving p a r t y . " 
Clemmons v . Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523, 1525 (10th C i r . 1992) 
( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ; Neiderhausser B l d r s . & Dev. Corp. v . 
Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
I I 
THERE ARE CONTROVERTED AND ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE DEFENDANT 
The presence of a dispute as to material facts disallows the 
granting of summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abott, 
562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977). 
The Defendant's motion for summary judgment is basically 
unsupported. But for a few carefully selected pages of the 
Plaintiff's 168-page deposition (See addendum attached to 
Defendant's Memorandum), the motion would have been naked. 
However, the Plaintiff respectfully submits that, conversely 
to the Defendant's addendum, other portions of the Deposition 
together with the Affidavits supporting this Answer, show that 
j 
there are many controverted and genuine issues of mater ia l f ac t s 
defeating the Defendant's summary judgment request . 
The Defendant 's main argument appears t o propose t h a t i t 
de se rves summary judgment because t h e P l a i n t i f f d id no t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y u t t e r the word s h o p l i f t i n g dur ing a p a r t i c u l a r 
exchange in the d e p o s i t i o n . However, p l e a s e cons ide r t h e 
following exchange in the Deposition: 
Q. (Defendant 's counsel ques t ion ing) : Okay. Did she say 
anything spec i f ica l ly? I want to know if you can r e c a l l any — 
A. (P la in t i f f answering): I cannot r e c a l l anything s p e c i f i c . 
This happened — See Priddy Depo. Page 57 Lines 4,5,6,7, 
Exhibit "C." 
During the Deposition, Mr. Priddy simply could not focus on 
the entire event. Mr. Priddy was not at ease and he was angry 
while reliving the humiliating moments when he was accused 
publicly of retail theft. Also, the questioning attorney often 
interfered with answers before they were completed. Mr. Priddy 
contends, under oath, that the Defendant's agents restrained him 
in the parking lot, made the accusations of retail theft, see 
Affidavit of John Priddy, Exhibit "D," and the Defendant's agents 
~-*-ir* further: "Didn't you see me? I was watching you down the 
.^" See Priddy Depo. Page 64 Lines 4,5,6,7, Exhibit "C." 
An eyewitness to the entire event, the Plaintiff's companion, 
was at the epicenter of the dispute. She heard the accusations of 
retail theft. See Affidavit of Jolene Priddy, Exhibit "A." The 
contentions of the Plaintiff, together with the affidavits, 
buttress his position that he was publicly and wrongly accused of 
theft. 
Tn effect, for purposes of this Motion, the Plaintiff's 
je is diametrically contrary to the Defendant's contentions, 
xiiese controverted material facts create issues of credibility of 
witnesses. The presence of a dispute as to material facts 
disallows the granting of summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, 
Inc. v. Abott, supra. See also, Billings ex rel. Billings v. 
Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991)(summary judgment 
proper only if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
admissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law). 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that at this point in the 
litigation, there are controverted issues of facts and of 
witnesses' credibility which the Court should not assess. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 
1258, 1261 (Utah 1984)(trial court must not weigh evidence of or 
assess credibility). The Court should deny the motion for summary 
judgment. 
II 
THE DEFENDANT MADE A SLANDER PER SE IN 
ACCUSING PLAINTIFF OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE 
The Defendant accused the Plaintiff of committing a criminal 
act. See Affidavit of Jolene Priddy, Exhibit "A" and Affidavit 
of John Priddv, Exhibit "D.M 
The Defendant accused the Plaintiff of THEFT, specifically 
RETAIL THEFT. This a crime of a serious nature. Retail theft is 
codified at Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-602 (1993 as 
amended). This law states in relevant part: 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he 
knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, 
transfers or causes to be offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining 
such merchandise or with the intention of depriving the 
merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit 
of such merchandise without paying the retail value of 
such merchandise; or 
.... 
Utah criminal law punishes retail theft the same as theft. 
See U.C.A. 76-6-606. This section refers to U.C.A. 76-4-412 which 
classifies (retail) theft ranging from a class B misdemeanor to a 
felony of the second degree punishable by up to 15 years in prison 
and fines. 
W. Prosser lists accusations of a crime as the first of the 
four categories that constitute slander per se if they are 
published without privilege or justification. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 755 (4th ed. 1971). 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that it is clear the 
Defendant's defamatory communication (commission of a criminal 
offense), which was repeated in public, amounts to slander per se. 
Id. The Plaintiff further submits that "slander per se requires 
no showing of special damages." Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 321 
(Utah 1979). 
Contrary to the Defendant's contention that there does not 
exist& a case of slander per se and that it deserves summary 
judgment [See Plaintiff's Memorandum at Page 7(B)], the Plaintiff 
respectfully submits that the Defendant is in error. 
Ill 
THE SLANDER PER SE HAS PUBLISHED 
The Defendant contends there was no publication of the 
slander per se. The Defendant offers nothing to support this 
contention. Instead, the Defendant invokes an opinion from the 
Georgia Court of Appeals. To wit, Flv v. Kroger. 432 S.E.2d 664 
Ga.App. 1993). 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Defendant's 
reliance upon Kroger is misplaced. The facts herein do not 
support application of that alien case. Kroger proposes that 
"absence of publication to individuals other than those involved 
in investigation of alleged shoplifting, the defendant deserves 
summary judgment," Id. at 666 (Plaintiff paraphrasing). 
However, in the case at bar, the publication was made in 
front of the general public exiting and entering the Defendant•s 
store. Besides the presence of the general public, of paramount 
importance is the fact that the Plaintiff sustained the accusation 
of retail theft in the presence of his companion. See Affidavit 
of Jolene Priddy, Exhibit "A." 
Thereforef the Plaintiff respectfully submits the slander per 
se was published for purposes of the Georgia ruling and prima 
facie requirements in the instant case. 
Ill 
THE PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SPECIFY HIS SPECIAL 
DAMAGES. THEY ARE INFERRED AS A HATTER OF LAW 
The Defendant accused the Plaintiff of a criminal act, retail 
theft [see Exhibits "A" & "D" ] , which carries fines and 
imprisonment of up to 15 years under Utah law. U.C.A. 76-6-412 
(1993 as amended). The Plaintiff has established that the 
Defendant's defamatory utterances constitute slander per se. W. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra. 
Thereforef the Plaintiff, having been the victim of slander 
per se, respectfully submits that he is not required to specify or 
enumerate his special damages and equitable damages if available. 
The injury to the Plaintiff can be presumed, as a matter of law, 
from the very words of the Defendant. Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 
318 (Utah 1979). Besides, as explained below, the Defendant 
should be assessed punitive damages as well as special damages 
because the defamation was willful and malicious. Prince v. 
Peterson. 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975) See also Allred v. Cook 
Supra. 
IV 
THE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING 
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE BECAUSE OF MALICE 
The Defendant, defending its defamatory actions, invokes the 
doctrine of conditional or qualified privilege merchants 
traditionally rely upon when detaining suspected thieves. The 
Plaintiff concedes that the law allows this privilege. See 
generally Brehanv v. Nordstrom, Inc. 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991); 
U.C.A. 76-9-506 (1990 as amended). However, the Plaintiff 
respectfully submits that there is a magnificent distinction 
between the Defendant's conditional or qualified privilege and 
absolute privilege. The Defendant's privilege is subject to 
attacks and can be defeated. Williams v. Standard Examiner 
Publishing Co., 27 P.2d 1, 13-14 (Utah 1933)(defendant privilege 
merely raises a prima facie presumption in favor of the 
Defendant). 
In order for a publication to be conditionally privileged, 
there must be present both a situation warranting a privilege and 
the use of the privilege in good faith and without express malice. 
Atlas Sewing Centers v. National Ass'n of Indep. Sewing Mach. 
Dealers, 260 F.2d 803, 808 (10th Cir. 1958). 
Applying the above law to the instant case, the Plaintiff 
respectfully submits that it is apparent, on the face of the 
evidence, that the only reason he was a suspect of retail theft on 
February 28, 1993, is because of his race and his ethnicity. The 
Plaintiff further submits that he is a Black man. 
The Defendant targeted the Plaintiff as a suspect the instant 
the Plaintiff entered the Defendant's store. See Shovko Video. 
Exhibit "C. " The Defendant followed the Plaintiff, trained its 
cameras on the Plaintiff wherever the Plaintiff went in the store 
while shopping. See Shovko Video, Exhibit "B. " The Defendant did 
not train its cameras on the Plaintifffs companion who is 
Caucasian. The Defendant did not train its cameras on other 
Caucasian shoppers who, just like the Plaintiff, were calmly 
shopping. The Plaintiff's race is not reasonable ground to 
warrant his suspicion of retail theft and the ultimatef public and 
serious accusation of a criminal offense. 
The video clearly shows that there was no reason—not one— 
warranting suspicion. See Affidavit of Greg Markham, Exhibit "E." 
Therefore, the acts of the Defendant constitutes, not only 
violations of the Plaintiff's civil rights, but EXPRESS MALICE. 
This malice defeats the Defendant's conditional or qualified 
privilege. Atlas Sewing Centers, supra. See also Seegmiller v. 
KSL, Inc. 626 P.2d 969, 972 (Utah 1981) (quoting St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). The Thompson Court held: 
[RJeckless Qonduct (or malice) is not measured by 
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, 
or would have investigated before publishing. There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion 
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as 
to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such 
doubts shows reckless for the truth or falsity and 
demonstrate actual malice. 
The video tape clearly shows that the Defendant did not have 
any reasons to stop and accuse the Plaintiff of retail theft. See 
Affidavit of Greg Markham, Exhibit "D." The defamatory accusation 
was recklessly and flagrantly based on race and race only since 
the video tape shows nothing to arouse suspicion. The Defendant 
acted from an improper motive, from a desire to do harmf knowing 
that its statements were not true and could not be proven. See 
Oqden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc. 551 P.2d 222, 225 (Utah 1976). The 
Defendant's actions constitute actual malice. 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that the general view is 
that the Defendant must have an actual and honest belief in the 
truth of the defamatory matter in order to be protected by a 
conditional privilege. Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 819 (Utah 
1958)(conditional privilege will not be recognized if the 
Defendant knows that his statements are unfounded). The 
requirement of good faith does not only apply to professional news 
organizations, Direct Import Buyers Ass'n v. KSL. Inc., 572 P.2d 
692, 694 Utah 1977), it exists as well for private individuals. 
Moench, 331 P.2d at 819. 
V 
THE PLAINTIFF SUFFERED AND CONTINUES 
TO SEVERE SUFFER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for 
infliction of emotional distress 
where the defendant intentionally engaged in some 
conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of 
inflicting emotional distress or, (b) where any 
reasonable person would have known that such would be 
the result; and his actions are of such a nature as to 
be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they 
offend against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. 
Samms v. Eccless, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (Utah 1961). 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that, in the case at bar, 
the Defendant's actions were reckless, outrageous and intolerable. 
The Defendant knew they were not true when the Defendant made the 
defamatory statements. Since the Defendant made the accusations, 
the Plaintiff has been physically unable to have a good night 
sleep as a direct result of the Defendant's actions. Further, the 
Plaintiff is mentally conscious of the unfortunate events the 
Defendant initiated on February 28, 1993, each time he enters a 
store. The Plaintiff will call, at trial, a psychiatrist to 
testify as to the symptoms and pathologies victims of racial 
prejudice suffers. At that time, the Plaintiff will be able to 
show the full effects of the racial victimization he sustained. 
The Plaintiff will also show that more often victims of racial 
discrimination do not seek psychiatric help. The just suffer. 
CONCLUSION 
This entire matter presents nothing but controverted facts. 
The issues in this case are disputed and the Defendant is not 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Thanks. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of July, 1994. 
M O N T R E U X L A W O F F I C E S 
^ • V Ob 
Bel-Ami de Montreux 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on July 22, 1994, by First Class United 
States mail, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum to the following address: 
Royal I. Hansen, Esq. 
H. Dennis Piercy, Esq. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
de Montreux 
EXHIBIT "A" 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOLENE PRIDDY 
BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX, # 6 2 0 7 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX LAW OFFICES 
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (801) 322-3021 
FAX NUMBER (801) 359-7406 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PRIDDY, ! 
PLAINTIFF, ! 
VS. J 
SHOPKO CORPORATION, ; 
DEFENDANT. ; 
i AFFIDAVIT OF JOLENE PRIDDY 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: CIVIL NO. 930905722 CV 
\ JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
:SS 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Jolene Priddy, having been sworn upon my oath, depose and 
state the following: 
1. On February 28, 1993, the Plaintiff accompanied me to 
Shopko to exchange a set of hair curlers that I had purchased at 
the Defendants store and which were defective. 
2. Prior to returning the defective set of rollers, the 
Defendant had given me authorization to return the rollers and to 
make the exchange. 
3. The Plaintiff and me did some shopping on that day for 
some household items. 
4. After shopping, the Plaintiff proceeded to the cashier 
to pay for the items he intended to buy and I went to the customer 
service desk to make the exchange. 
5. After making the exchange, I returned to the cashier's 
station where the Plaintiff was checking out. The Plaintiff paid 
for the merchandise he bought and, with me carrying the bag 
containing the new rollers I had just exchanged and the Plaintiff 
carrying the bag containing the household items he had just paid 
for, we exited the Defendant's store. 
6. When we reached the parking lot, a group composed of 
several of the Defendant's employees encircled us and made it 
clear that we would not go anywhere. 
7. At that time, the leader of the group, a lady, told the 
Plaintiff very loudly that he was shoplifting and that he must 
open the shopping bags for inspection and return to the store to 
be searched. 
8. I told the lady no one was shoplifting and she said to 
me: "You are a liar. We saw him shoplifting." 
9. Several of the customers entering and exiting the 
Defendant's store stopped to witness the arrest. 
10. The Plaintiff was accused of shoplifting on that day. 
DATED this /#//qay of *J[, A/ 1994. 
Jiplene Priddy, Affia 
f^fZ^ 
rant 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this if day of 
^Ar 
r 
yL. , 1994. 
o»r=^v NOTARY PUBLIo 
"!§k F.iCJ-!Ana '?. FOUGH . 
310 South Ma:n, S,JIIO CCS 
Salt Lake City. U»ah 941 Oi 
My Commission txolras 
May 22, 1998 
9 T 4 T O CW I T T 1 U 
EXHIBIT "B" 
SBOPKO VIDEO TAPE 
SEE COPY OF VIDEO TAPE PROVIDED WITH THIS ANSWER 
(DEFENDANT HAS ITS OWN COPY OF THE TAPE) 
EXHIBIT "C" 
JOHN PRIDDY OEPO. 
A She was insistent — my* recollection, she 
was insistent that wefre going to go in the office 
and, you know, find out what was in. the bag~-
Q Okay- Did. she say anything- specifically 
to you? X want to- know if you can recall any — 
A X can't recall anything specific- This 
happened — 
Q That's the sense is she still wanted to 
know what was in the bag? 
A She wanted to know what was in the bag. 
And r wasn't going* to have — be searched in a 
public environments 
Q Okay- And so you are walking there, and 
you and Jolener and Jolene doesn't have any 
conversation, with ShopKo people? 
A. She- may have had- r — r don/t recall. 
Q. Okay-
A I don't recall. 
Q And did you have — do you recall any 
otheir things that were said between you and JTolene? 
Did you have a conversation with her on the way in 
afteir you said, "Fine, l e f s go in1*? 
A X probably said, T toli you so. T told 
you so.^ I may- have — r may have,, you knowr said 
that to her a couple of times*- "X can't believe 
MARY D- QUINN CSRr RPR 
(801) 328-1188 
57 
1. down"* was the first thing- The next items.a£ 
2 conversation that takes places Thaf'sr by Jackie, 
3 once again*. And what's youir response to that.2 
4 A I says, "No* Xfm not going* to sit down-" 
!T And then she proceeds to tell me, ^Dou't you — 
6 didn't you think X was watching you?** 
7 Q Okay- This is the first time to you she 
8 said, "Didn't you think ~ " this is — 
9 A "Didn't you see me? Didn't you see me? 
10 I've been watching you-" 
11 Q She said that to you, -Didn't you see me?" 
12 A Yeah. And I'm thinking — 
13 Q And what was yourr response? 
14 A "No- X didn't see you—-
15 I ft Okay^ You said,- "Ho^X didn't see you"? 
16 A No-
17 Q And was it a fairly calm conversation, or 
18 was it a heated conversation? How would you 
19 describe it? 
20 A It was a heated conversation-
21 Q Okay- And was it heated from the very 
22 beginning, or was it becoming more heated, as you 
23 were going.* along? 
24 A It was boiling- Not there yet^ but — 
25 circumstances-




AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN PRIDDY 
BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX, # 6 2 0 7 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX LAW OFFICES 
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (801) 322-3021 
FAX NUMBER (801) 359-7406 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PRIDDY, J 
PLAINTIFF, 3 
VS. J 
SHOPKO CORPORATION, : 
DEFENDANT. J 
: AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN PRIDDY 
s IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
: MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBIT 
\ CIVIL NO. 930905722 CV 
: JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, John Priddy, having been sworn upon my oath, depose and 
state the following: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
2. On February 28, 1994, I went to Shopko with Jolene 
Priddy to exchange a defective set of hair curlers. While at 
Shopko, I purchased some household items for which I paid the 
cashier. 
3. After shopping, I left the store with Jolene Priddy. 
4. In the parking lot of the store, several of the 
Defendant's employees encircled me and Jolene Priddy. 
5. Then and theref Ms. Jackie Boysen, the Defendant's loss 
prevention employee accused me directly and loudly of shoplifting 
and demanded to inspect the shopping bags for evidence. 
6. Several people stop to view the spectacle. 
7. I was humiliated and embarrassed. Since this 
unfortunate episode, I have been unable to get a good night sleep 
and any time I go shopping anywhere I am afraid of being accused 
of shoplifting simply because of my race. 
DATED this \ 
TVr 
day of -^•W-S , 1994. 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 
W ^ X , 1994. 
tr 
UlyT 
^£u« l i c Notai?f 
day of 
r vr / . r ,y :^VHI u: 
^ T A T E *JZ~ '-^AI* 
•or . ,w,iu 
. •*> * . * ' , . < & ? \ 7 -. *- •'--» „ 
P& 0 : '"'5 /'-v °*:! La:<0 CtV- u~v- - 4 1 2 < ! 
Ki&^'&Y ^ Cosnrcfcslcn Expires 
V
^ 5 ^ 1 X May 22, 1998 
i — STATR QF UTAH 
EXHIBIT "E" 
AFFIDAVIT OF GREG MARKHAM 
BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX, # 6 2 0 7 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX LAW OFFICES 
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (801) 3 2 2 - 3 0 2 1 
FAX NUMBER (801) 359-7406 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PRIDDY, S 
PLAINTIFF, J 
VS. i 
SHOPKO CORPORATION, : 
DEFENDANT . ; 
AFFIDAVIT OF QIEG MARKHAM 
\ IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: CIVIL NO. 930905722 CV 
i JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Greg Markham, having been sworn upon my oath, depose and 
state the following: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah and I worked for 14 
years in management for K-Mart Enterprises. 
2. As part of my duties, I supervised loss prevention 
personnel. 
3. I have had the opportunity to review the video tape 
produced by the Defendant in the above-entitled matter which 
featured the Plaintiff shopping at Shopko. 
4. There is not, in my expert opinion, any reason to 
warrant a reasonable doubt that the Plaintiff was shoplifting at 
the store based on the evidence. 
5. If anything, the tape clearly shows that the Plaintiff 
should not have been stopped at all. 
6. It is my opinion that the Defendant did not have any 
reasons to accused the Plaintiff of shoplifting. 
7. It is my opinion that the Defendant accused the 
Defendant of Shoplifting for reasons other than reasonable 
suspicion of retail theft. 
DATED this / ^ ^ day of y^/*7 , 1994. 
/Gt&K MarWiam, 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this / ?^~ day of 
CTMT r 1994. 
•v^-
>____ ^--^Public Notary 
ADDENDUM F 
J o l e n e P r i d d y ' s A f f i d a v i t 
ai 
BEL-AMI DE MONTOEOX, # 6 2 0 7 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREDX LAW OFFICES 
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (801) 322-3021 
FAX NUMBER (801) 359-7406 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PRIDDY, 
PLAINTIFF , J 
V S . J 
SHOPKO CORPORATION, J 
DEFENDANT. : 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOLENE PRIDDY 
\ IH SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: CIVIL NO. 930905722 CV 
: JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Jolene Priddy, having been sworn upon my oath, depose and 
state the following: 
1. On February 28, 1993, the Plaintiff accompanied me to 
Shopko to exchange a set of hair curlers that I had purchased at 
the Defendant's store and which were defective. 
2. Prior to returning the defective set of rollers, the 
Defendant had given me authorization to return the rollers and to 
make the exchange. 
3. The Plaintiff and me did some shopping on that day for 
some household items. 
4. After shopping, the Plaintiff proceeded to the cashier 
to pay for the items he intended to buy and I went to the customer 
service desk to make the exchange. 
5. After making the exchange, I returned to the cashier's 
station where the Plaintiff was checking out. The Plaintiff paid 
for the merchandise he bought and, with me carrying the bag 
containing the new rollers I had just exchanged and the Plaintiff 
carrying the bag containing the household items he had just paid 
for, we exited the Defendant's store. 
6. When we reached the parking lot, a group composed of 
several of the Defendant' s employees encircled us and made it 
clear that we would not go anywhere. 
7. At that timef the leader of the group, a lady, told the 
Plaintiff very loudly that he was shoplifting and that he must 
open the shopping bags for inspection and return to the store to 
be searched. 
8. I told the lady no one was shoplifting and she said to 
me: "You are a liar. We saw him shoplifting." 
9. Several of the customers entering and exiting the 
Defendant's store stopped to witness the arrest. 
10. The Plaintiff was accused of shoplifting on that day. 
DATED this / 5? 7/day of ^frJ / / 1994-
Jolene Priddy, Affife ant 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 
, 1994. 
^ day of 
M Salt Lake City. Utah 3410i 
My Commission txoiras 
Mav22 1998 
ADDENDUM 6 
G r e g M a r k h a m ' s A f f i d a v i t 
BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX, # 6 2 0 7 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX LAW OFFICES 
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (801) 322-3021 
FAX NUMBER (801) 359-7406 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PRIDDY, i 
PLAINTIFF, J 
VS. i 
SHOPKO CORPORATION, J 
DEFENDANT. J 
AFFIDAVIT OF GREG MARKHAM 
: IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
; CIVIL NO. 930905722 CV 
: JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Greg Markham, having been sworn upon my oath, depose and 
state the following: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah and I worked for 14 
years in management for K-Mart Enterprises. 
2. As part of my duties, I supervised loss prevention 
personnel. 
3. I have had the opportunity to review the video tape 
produced by the Defendant in the above-entitled matter which 
featured the Plaintiff shopping at Shopko. 
4. There is not, in my expert opinion, any reason to 
warrant a reasonable doubt that the Plaintiff was shoplifting at 
the store based on the evidence. 
5. If anything, the tape clearly shows that the Plaintiff 
should not have been stopped at all. 
6. It is my opinion that the Defendant did not have any 
reasons to accused the Plaintiff of shoplifting. 
7. It is my opinion that the Defendant accused the 
Defendant of Shoplifting for reasons other than reasonable 
suspicion of retail theft. 
DATED this _y<*?' day of fts/*/* 1994. 
*" Martenam, Al-fxdlit 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this / 7"^ day of 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 



















BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON FRIDAY, THE 3H DAY OF 
AUGUST, 1994, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 8:40 O'CLOCK A.M., 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX 
MONTREUX LAW OFFICES 
310 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
ROYAL I. HANSON, 
H. DENNIS PIERCEY 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 DESERET PLAZA 
NO. 15 EAST FIRST SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
I N D E X 
MR. PIERCEY'S ARGUMENT 
MR. DE MONTREUX'S ARGUMENT 

































P R O C E E D I N G S 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED BEFORE 
THE COURT IS THE MATTER OF JOHN PRIDDY, P-R-I-D-D-Y, 
VERSUS SHOPKO CORPORATION. THE CASE IS NUMBER 93-090-
5722. 
COUNSEL, WILL YOU STATE YOUR APPEARANCES, 
PLEASE? 
MR. DE MONTREUX: BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME JUST SAY THAT THAT NAME 
STATED THAT WAY IS NOT GOING TO BE VERY CLEAR FOR ME TO 
KNOW HOW TO PUT ON THE RECORD SO YOU MAYBE BETTER SPELL 
IT, PLEASE. 
MR. DE MONTREUX: IT'S B AS IN BOY, E-L DASH 
CAPITAL A-M-I, DE MONTREUX, D AS IN DAVID, E SPACE CAPITAL 
M-O-N-T AS IN TOY, R-E, U-X. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. NOW I NOTICE THAT YOUR 
ACCENT IS PRINCIPALLY FRENCH; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. DE MONTREUX: YES, YOUR HONOR, IT IS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I WOULD JUST CAUTION YOU TO BE 
CAREFUL BECAUSE WE ARE MAKING A RECORD HERE. AND I THINK 
A FRENCH ACCENT IS DELIGHTFUL BUT I NEED TO BE SURE THAT 
THE REPORTER GETS EVERYTHING ACCURATELY. SO PLEASE BE 





TO BE ACCURATE 
THANK YOU. 
HANSEN: ROYAL HANSEN FOR 
YOURSELF. 




























JUDGE YOUNG: AND HOW DO YOU DETERMINE YOU WISH 
TO ARGUE? 
MR. HANSEN: MR. PIERCEY WILL. WE HAVE GOT A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, YOUR HONOR. AND I'M 
WONDERING, THAT MAY MOOT THE OTHER MATTERS. IF IT'S 
POSSIBLE TO HEAR THAT I THINK WE COULD DO THAT AND SEE IF 
WE CAN'T DISPOSE OF EVERYTHING AT ONE TIME. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. MR. DE MONTREUX, DO 
YOU DESIRE--DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THAT? 
MR. DE MONTREUX: I DO NOT HAVE ANY OBJECTION, 
YOUR HONOR. A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS FILED 
INITIALLY. FIRST. THANK YOU. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WE WILL HAVE THAT MATTER GO FIRST. 
MR. PIERCEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. IF IT 
PLEASE THE COURT, THIS MATTER INVOLVES TWO CLAIMS. THE 
FIRST CLAIM IS DEFAMATION OR SLANDER AND THE SECOND CLAIM 
IS NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
THE ACTION ARISES OUT OF AN INCIDENT AT SHOPKO 
IN SUGARHOUSE FEBRUARY 28, 1993. YOUR HONOR, THE FACTS IN 
THIS CASE ARE UNDISPUTED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MOTION 


















1 SUBSEQUENTLY MARRIED, WENT TO SHOP AT SHOPKO. AND HIS 
2 FIANCEE HAD PURCHASED SOME CURLERS THAT SHE WAS GOING TO 
3 EXCHANGE. 
4 THEY ENTERED THE STORE. AND THEY HAD A NON-
5 SHOPKO BAG. AND APPARENTLY THE CURLERS WERE IN THAT, THAT 
6 THEY BROUGHT IN TO RETURN, BUT THEY DID NOT STOP AND TALK 
7 TO ANYONE AT THE SERVICE DESK BEFORE GOING INTO THE STORE. 
8 ON THE WAY OUT THE PLAINTIFF PAID FOR OTHER 
9 ITEMS THAT THEY PICKED UP WHILE THEY WERE SHOPPING. AND 
10 PLAINTIFF'S FIANCEE WENT THROUGH THE CHECKOUT LINE WITH 
11 THE NEW CURLERS AND SHE DIDN'T PAY FOR THEM THERE BUT SHE 
12 WENT TO THE SERVICE DESK--SHE WENT THROUGH THE CHECKOUT 
13 LINE WITH THE NEW CURLERS WITHOUT PAYING FOR THEM BUT SHE 
14 WENT TO THE SERVICE DESK TO AFFECT THE EXCHANGE. 
15 AS THEY LEFT THE STORE SOME SHOPKO EMPLOYEES 
16 APPROACHED THEM AND THE LEADER SAID THAT SHE WANTED TO 
17 LOOK IN THE BAG OF PLAINTIFF'S FIANCEE. PLAINTIFF SAID 
18 NO. AND SHOPKO'S EMPLOYEES SAID, LET'S GO IN THE OFFICE, 
19 AND THE PLAINTIFF SAID FINE. 
20 INSIDE, THE PLAINTIFF REFUSED TO SIT DOWN AND 
21 DEMANDED TO SEE THE STORE MANAGER. THE STORE MANAGER CAME 
22 IN AND PLAINTIFF AND HIS FIANCEE EXPLAINED THE CIRCUM-
23 STANCES OF THE EXCHANGE. AND THE PLAINTIFF TESTIFIES THAT 
24 AT THAT POINT THE EMPLOYEE RECOGNIZED THAT SHE HAD MADE A 
25 MISTAKE AND THE MANAGER RECOGNIZED THE MISTAKE. AND 
PLAINTIFF HIMSELF SAYS THAT AT LEAST ONE EMPLOYEE 
EXPRESSED REAL REMORSE. 
AND PLAINTIFF AND HIS FIANCEE WENT TO THEIR CAR 
AND THEY LEFT. 
NOW, WHAT IS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT 
QUESTION, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT PLAINTIFF CLEARLY TESTIFIED 
EXTENSIVELY AT THE DEPOSITION THAT THE EMPLOYEES ASKED TO 
LOOK IN THE BAG, BUT HELD BY PLAINTIFF'S FIANCEE, BUT 
NOBODY CALLED PLAINTIFF A THIEF. WE'VE QUOTED IN OUR 
REPLY MEMORANDUM TWO FULL PAGES OF DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
GOING INTO THIS. AND I THINK IT'S ALL SUMMED UP BY THIS 
QUESTION AND ANSWER AT PAGE 125. THE QUESTION TO PLAIN-
TIFF, STARTING AT THE END OF THESE TWO PAGES IS, "WHAT'S 
IMPORTANT TO ME IS THAT NOBODY CALLED YOU A THIEF, BUT 
THEY DID ASK YOU TO LOOK IN YOUR BAG." AND PLAINTIFF 
SAYS, "RIGHT." 
NOW, IN ADDITION, THERE'S NO--THERE'S BEEN NO 
EVIDENCE OF ANY SPECIAL, ECONOMIC DAMAGES WHICH ARE 
REQUIRED FOR A CLAIM OF SLANDER, THAT IS NOT SLANDER 
PER SE, AND THERE'S NO CLAIM OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN THIS 
CASE. AND THE INCIDENT OCCURRED ALMOST A YEAR AND A HALF 
AGO AND PLAINTIFF HAS NEVER SOUGHT ANY MEDICAL TREATMENT 
DUE TO THE INCIDENT. 
NOW, YOUR HONOR, THE DEPOSITION CLEARLY SHOWS 
THAT THERE WAS NO DEFAMATORY STATEMENT. AFTER WE FILED 
1 THE MOTION, BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S OWN DEPOSITION, IN 
2 OPPOSING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF HAS 
3 TRIED TO DISOWN HIS TESTIMONY THAT NOBODY CALLED HIM A 
4 THIEF. YOUR HONOR, WE'VE CITED IN OUR REPLY THE CASE OF 
5 WEBSTER V. SILL. AND THIS IS A CASE DIRECTLY ON POINT 
6 THAT PREVENTS THE PLAINTIFF FROM SWITCHING POSITIONS LIKE 
7 THIS AT THIS POINT. 
8 WHAT THE FACTS WERE, ESSENTIALLY, IN WEBSTER V. 
9 SILL, IS THAT A RENTER HAD SLIPPED ON THE LAWN WHILE 
10 MOWING AND HAD SUFFERED A PHYSICAL INJURY. AND THE DEPO-
11 SITION TESTIMONY WAS THAT THE RENTER DIDN'T NOTICE THAT 
12 THE LAWN WAS WET OR SLIPPERY. AND THEN WHEN THE MOTION 
13 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS FILED, APPARENTLY THE PLAINTIFF 
14 SAYS, WELL, THE DEFENDANT TOLD ME THAT THEY WATERED THE 
15 LAWN. SO THIS SHOULD BE A FACTUAL ISSUE ABOUT WHAT 
16 HAPPENED, BUT THE COURT SAID NO, DEPOSITIONS ARE VERY 
17 IMPORTANT BECAUSE THEY ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION AND A 
18 PLAINTIFF CAN'T DISOWN THE DEPOSITION TESTIMONY FOR 
19 PURPOSES OF CREATING AN ISSUE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
20 THAT'S NOT A GENUINE ISSUE BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS 
21 ALREADY ESTABLISHED THE FACT WITH THE DEPOSITION. 
22 NOW, THIS ISN'T JUST AN ASIDE IN THIS CASE, IT'S 
23 A CENTRAL ISSUE. PLAINTIFF WAS PRESENT THE ENTIRE TIME 
24 THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT. THE DEPOSITION TESTIMONY IS 
25 EXTENSIVE AND UNEQUIVOCAL AND PLAINTIFF WAS REPRESENTED BY 
1 COUNSEL ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE. IF THERE WERE ANY 
2 MISTAKE AT ALL THEN PLAINTIFF WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL 
3 WHO COULD CORRECT THE MISTAKE BY QUESTIONING THE PLAIN-
4 TIFF. BUT IN THE DEPOSITION PLAINTIFF TESTIFIED THERE WAS 
5 NO DEFAMATORY STATEMENT AND HE'S BOUND BY HIS TESTIMONY 
6 AND CANNOT DENY HIS OWN WORDS TO AVOID SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
7 NOW, YOUR HONOR, IN ADDITION TO THE LACK OF ANY 
8 DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS, CERTAINLY THERE'S NO SLANDER 
9 PER SE, NOBODY'S SAYING HE'S A THIEF, OR WORDS THAT ARE SO 
10 DAMAGING THAT THE COURT MUST PRESUME SPECIAL DAMAGES, 
11 NOTHING LIKE THIS IS IN PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY, SO IN 
12 ADDITION TO THIS THE CLAIM WOULD FAIL FOR OTHER REASONS. 
13 THERE ARE NO SPECIAL, ECONOMIC DAMAGES WHICH ARE 
14 REQUIRED. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, YOUR HONOR, THAT ANY 
15 OTHER CUSTOMERS HEARD ANYTHING. THE PLAINTIFF'S FIANCEE 
16 WAS PRESENT FOR EVERYTHING AND SHE KNEW--AND SHE SAYS SHE 
17 KNEW AND SHE TOLD THEM THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD NOT SHOP-
18 LIFTED AND, IN FACT, IT WAS HER BAG THAT THE EMPLOYEE 
19 WANTED TO LOOK IN. 
20 FINALLY, YOUR HONOR, MERCHANTS HAVE AN EXPRESS 
21 STATUTORY RIGHT IN UTAH CODE IN SECTION 8-11-17 TO ASK TO 
22 VIEW MERCHANDISE FROM THE STORE. AND THE EMPLOYEE IN 
23 ASKING TO, ASKING TO LOOK IN THE BAG, WAS JUST DOING WHAT 
24 THE LAW EXPRESSLY ALLOWS. 
25 NOW, THE PLAINTIFF ADMITS THAT QUALIFIED 
8 
1 PRIVILEGES EXIST IN THIS CASE. AND PRIVILEGE MEANS THAT, 
2 ACCORDING TO BREHANY V. NORDSTORM, THAT THE INTEREST, IN 
3 THIS CASE THE MERCHANT'S INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE 
4 ENORMOUS LOSSES THAT MERCHANTS CAN SUFFER, THAT MEANS THAT 
5 THE INTERESTS IS SO IMPORTANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME 
6 LATITUDE FOR MISTAKE. 
7 BUT FINALLY, YOUR HONOR--NOW PLAINTIFF'S TESTI-
8 MONY INDICATES THAT THERE WAS, THEY RECOGNIZE THE MISTAKE 
9 AND OFF THEY WENT. THAT WAS THE END OF IT. BUT I THINK 
10 THE CRITICAL POINT, YOUR HONOR, IS THERE WAS NO DEFAMATORY 
11 STATEMENT. THAT'S ESTABLISHED IN DEPOSITION. 
12 NOW THE SECOND CLAIM IS NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
13 EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. IN RESPONSE TO OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
14 JUDGMENT PLAINTIFF CITED SAMMS V. ECCLESS. WHICH IS A CASE 
15 FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, WHICH 
16 ISN'T ALLEGED HERE. THE CLAIM IS ENTITLED, NEGLIGENT 
17 INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, BUT WE'VE RESPONDED TO 
13 THAT TO THE EXTENT, YOUR HONOR, THAT IT WAS NEITHER INTEN-
19 TIONAL NOR--WE'VE CITED BOISJOLY. A JUDGE WINDER FEDERAL 
20 DISTRICT COURT CASE. AND PLAINTIFF, IN FACT, CITED 
21 SPERBER, A UTAH CASE. AND BOTH OF THOSE CASES FOUND THE 
22 CONDUCT WAS NOT "SO OUTRAGEOUS IN CHARACTER, SO EXTREME IN 
23 DEGREE AS TO GO BEYOND ALL POSSIBLE BOUNDS OF DECENCY, AND 
24 TO BE REGARDED AS ATROCIOUS, AND UTTERLY INTOLERABLE IN A 





IN SPERBER THE COURT SAID, "FIRING AN EMPLOYEE 
FOR A FALSE REASON, AS UNDESIRABLE AS THAT CAN BE, ISN'T 
THE SORT OF ATROCITY THAT IS REQUIRED FOR INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION." SO IT DOESN'T APPLY BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS OWN 
5 TESTIMONY, THERE WAS THE RECOGNITION OF THE MISTAKE. AND 
6 THAT'S ALL THIS IS. BUT THE ISSUE IN THE COMPLAINT IS 
7 NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. AND WE CITED 
8 THE HANSEN V. MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CASE, I BELIEVE, WHICH 
9 HOLDS THAT ABSENT PHYSICAL INJURY, WHICH IS NOT INVOLVED 
10 HERE, NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REQUIRES 
11 EXPERT TESTIMONY SHOWING MENTAL ILLNESS. AND IN HANSEN 
12 THE COURT SPECIFICALLY DEALT WITH CLAIMS OF SLEEPLESSNESS 
13 AND CITED A CASE INVOLVING HEADACHES, INSOMNIA, AND THOSE 
14 KINDS OF THINGS. AND THAT SAID THAT IS NOT MENTAL ILL-
15 NESS, THAT DOESN'T RISE TO THE LEVEL OF WHAT IS REQUIRED 
16 FOR A CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
17 NOW IN THIS CASE, AS THE COURT RECOGNIZED IN THE 
18 ANDALEX CASE, TO AVOID SUMMARY JUDGMENT THE PARTY WITH THE 
19 BURDEN, IN THIS CASE PLAINTIFF HAS THE BURDEN ON THESE 
20 CLAIMS, MUST MAKE HIS SUFFICIENT SHOWING TO ESTABLISH ALL 
21 OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM ON WHICH THEY HAVE 
22 A BURDEN TO OVERCOME SUMMARY JUDGMENT. IN THIS CASE, YOUR 
23 HONOR, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION THAT 
24 THESE CLAIMS DO NOT EXIST AND THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE 
25 I DISMISSED. THANK YOU. 
10 
1 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. PIERCEY. 
2 MR. DE MONTREUX? 
3 MR. DE MONTREUX: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MAY IT 
4 PLEASE THE COURT, I WORK FOR MR. PRIDDY. 
5 JUDGE YOUNG: I'M SORRY, I AM NOT UNDERSTANDING 
6 YOU. 
7 MR. DE MONTREUX: I'M JUST INTRODUCING MYSELF 
8 AGAIN. 
9 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
10 MR. DE MONTREUX: ASKING THE COURT FOR PERMIS-
11 SION TO SPEAK. 
12 JUDGE YOUNG: YES. 
13 MR. DE MONTREUX: I WILL TRY TO SPEAK AS SLOW AS 
14 I CAN, YOUR HONOR, TO HELP OUT. 
15 YOUR HONOR, THE DEFENDANTS HAVE TRIED TO SHOW 
16 YOU SOME FACTS. THEY'VE TRIED TO PUT FORTH SOME FACTS AND 
17 THEY ARE ARGUING THAT THE FACTS ARE NOT DISPUTED. HOW-
18 EVER, THE FACTS ARE DISPUTED. 
19 MY CLIENT CONTENDS THAT WHEN HE LEFT SHOPKO AND 
20 WAS OUTSIDE IN THE PARKING LOT HE WAS ACCOSTED BY SIX 
21 DIFFERENT, SIX PEOPLE, BY THE PEOPLE WORKING FOR THE 
22 DEFENDANT AND THAT THEY ACCUSED HIM OF SHOPLIFTING. AND 
23 THE PLAINTIFF, MY CLIENT, FILED A VERIFIED MOTION, A 
24 VERIFIED COMPLAINT. IN THAT COMPLAINT PARAGRAPH 10 







 SHOPLIFTING. AT PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE COMPLAINT. AND THE 
2
 I INFORMATION THERE--THE INFORMATION WAS NOT VERY CLEAR AS 
TO WHAT DEFENDANT WERE DOING. HOWEVER, THERE ARE SEVERAL 
4
 I PAGES IN THAT DEPOSITION THAT CLEARLY, CLEARLY SHOW THAT 
5
 MY CLIENT IN THE DEPOSITION HAS GIVEN, IN THE AFFIDAVITS, 
6
 ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE COMPLAINT, 
7
 I WHICH IS A VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND THERE ARE EVIDENCE--
JUDGE YOUNG: IN WHAT? 
MR. DE MONTREUX: THE AFFIDAVITS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AFFIDAVIT? 
11
 I MR. DE MONTREUX: YES. THAT ARE GIVEN IN 
12
 SUPPORT OF THE COMPLAINT THAT DO NOT CONTRADICT THE DEPO-
13
 SITION. THEY SIMPLY AMPLIFY WORDS OUT OF THE DEPOSITION 
14
 AND THEY ALSO AMPLIFY THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT. 
15
 | JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME JUST ASK YOU THIS, MR. DE 
MONTREUX. 
MR. DE MONTREUX: YES. 
18
 I JUDGE YOUNG: SUPPOSE THAT THEY DID SAY--WELL, 
19 FIRST, GIVEN THAT ALL OF THE SIX EMPLOYEES CAME OUT, THEY 
20 SURROUNDED MR. PRIDDY AND HIS FIANCEE THEN, AND THEY DID 
21 SAY WE THINK YOU HAVE BEEN SHOPLIFTING, OR SOMETHING TO 
22
 THAT EFFECT, THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH THAT IN THE 
23 STATUTE IF THEY HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS TO COME TO THAT 
24 CONCLUSION, IS THERE? 




1 THERE IS A REASONABLE GROUND FOR IT. HOWEVER--
2 JUDGE YOUNG: NOW IS THERE A REASONABLE GROUND 
3 FOR IT IF THEY OBSERVE THEM, OR I DON'T KNOW WHO DID IT, 
4 BUT IF THEY OBSERVE THEM PICKING UP SOME CURLERS, A NEW 
5 SET OF CURLERS AND PUTTING THEM IN A BAG, AND WALKING 
6 THROUGH THE CHECKOUT COUNTER TO THE SERVICE DESK WHILE ONE 
7 OF THEM REMAINS AT THE CHECKOUT COUNTER PAYING FOR OTHER 
8 ITEMS, BUT THE BAG WITH THE CURLERS IN IT IS TAKEN THROUGH 
9 THAT CHECKOUT COUNTER, THEN OFF TO A SERVICE DESK? 
10 MR. DE MONTREUX: WELL, YOUR HONOR, YOU MUST 
11 UNDERSTAND AGAIN THE FACTS OF THE CASE. IT HAPPENS THAT 
12 MRS. PRIDDY, NOW THEY ARE MARRIED, WENT TO SHOPKO BEFORE 
13 THAT DAY. SHE WAS GIVEN A RAINCHECK. SHE WAS TOLD TO GO 
14 TO THE STORE, MAKE THE EXCHANGE AND THEN TAKE IT TO THE 
15 CAR, WHICH IS WHAT SHE DID. NOW THE CURLERS WERE NOT IN A 
16 BAG, THEY WERE IN HER HAND. 
17 JUDGE YOUNG: I SEE. 
18 MR. DE MONTREUX: AND IF YOU LOOK AT THE FLOOR 
19 PLAN OF THE STORE, THE CASH REGISTERS ARE HERE, THAT'S THE 
20 CHECKOUT, AND THE CUSTOMER DESK TO MAKE THE EXCHANGE IS 
21 RIGHT THERE. SO SHE WALKED THERE TO MAKE THE EXCHANGE 
22 WHILE MR. PRIDDY HAS TO PAY. THAT'S BY THE STORE'S OWN 
23 MODUS OPERANDI, YOU WOULD DO BUSINESS. YOU GO, YOU TAKE 
24 WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO EXCHANGE, YOU GO TO THE DESK AND 
25 MAKE THE EXCHANGE. THEY FOLLOWED THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 
13 
1 STORE. SO, THEREFORE, YOUR HONOR--AND EVEN THE ARGUMENT 
2 THAT THEY WENT BACK TO THE STORE--
3 JUDGE YOUNG: I AM NOT UNDERSTANDING YOU. 
4 MR. DE MONTREUX: EVEN THE ARGUMENT THAT MY 
5 CLIENT TOOK A BAG FROM A DIFFERENT STORE TO THEIR STORE IS 
6 NOT A VERY GOOD ARGUMENT BECAUSE AS A WAY OF DOING BUSI-
7 NESS IN THIS COUNTRY EVERY TIME YOU GO TO THE MALL YOU 
8 ALWAYS CARRY BAGS FROM DIFFERENT STORES AS YOU ARE 
9 SHOPPING. SO THAT IS JUST NOT ANYTHING SO NOVEL HERE TO 
10 CREATE A PRESUMPTION THAT MR. PRIDDY SHOPLIFTED. 
11 JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME ASK YOU, SO THAT I'M CLEAR, 
12 THE PRIDDYS WERE CARRYING A SEPARATE BAG WITH THE CURLERS 
13 THAT THEY HAD BEFORE? 
14 MR. DE MONTREUX: THE CURLERS THAT THEY HAD 
15 BEFORE WERE IN A DIFFERENT BAG, YES. 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. NOW, I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND 
17 WHAT YOU SAID--I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY THERE WAS A 
18 RAINCHECK FOR CURLERS IF THEY BOUGHT SOME CURLERS AND THEY 
19 HAD SOME CURLERS THEY WERE BRINGING IN. THE RAINCHECK 
20 WOULD MEAN THEY DIDN'T HAVE WHAT THEY WANTED. 
21 MR. DE MONTREUX: WHEN THEY TOOK THE CURLERS 
22 BACK THE FIRST TIME TO MAKE THE EXCHANGE, SHOPKO WAS OUT 
23 OF 'EM. IN ORDER TO KEEP THE PRICE, SO THE PRICE WOULDN'T 
24 CHANGE, SHOPKO GAVE THEM A DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE 



























JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. SO THEY HAD SOME INITIAL 
CURLERS, THEY WANTED TO EXCHANGE THEM FOR BOTH A DIFFERENT 
TYPE AND ALSO SOME THAT WORKED, I GUESS. 
MR. DE MONTREUX: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THESE CURLERS WERE DEFECTIVE THEY 
HAD? 
MR. DE MONTREUX: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO THEY HAD THEN THE DEFECTIVE 
CURLERS PLUS THE RAINCHECK FOR THE CURLERS THAT SHOPKO HAD 
BEEN OUT OF AND THEY WERE PRESERVING THE PRICE OF THOSE 
CURLERS BY THE RAINCHECK. 
MR. DE MONTREUX: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. NOW THEY THEN HAD THE 
OLD CURLERS IN A BAG. 
MR. DE MONTREUX: NOT IN A BAG--THE OLD CURLERS 
WERE IN A BAG, YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THEY TOOK THE NEW CURLERS IN THEIR 
HAND--
MR. DE MONTREUX: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: --WALKED THROUGH THE COUNTER, 
THROUGH THE CHECKOUT COUNTER AND WENT THEN TO THE SERVICE 
DESK. 
MR. DE MONTREUX: AS THEY WERE INSTRUCTED TO DO. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, AS THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN 
EXPECTED TO DO, LIKELY. 
15 
11 MR. DE MONTREUX: YES. 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: I'M HAVING A HARD TIME UNDER-
3 STANDING, MR. DE MONTREUX, WHY MR. PRIDDY DIDN'T JUST SAY 
4 IN THE PARKING LOT, THERE MUST BE SOME MISTAKE AND WE HAVE 
5 THESE CURLERS THAT WE HAD THE RIGHT TO EXCHANGE, AND WE 
6 HAD THE CLAIM CHECK TO DEAL WITH IT. 
7 MR. DE MONTREUX: YOUR HONOR, PERHAPS THAT IS A 
8 GOOD ARGUMENT, HOWEVER, IT IS THE ENTIRE WAY THE MATTER 
9 HAPPENED. SUDDENLY MR. PRIDDY FOUND HIMSELF SURROUNDED 
10 AND ACCUSED OF SHOPLIFTING. 
11 JUDGE YOUNG: IS THERE ANYTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT 
12 THAT? IT SEEMS TO ME THAT'S WHAT ANYONE WOULD DO WITH A 
13 SHOPLIFTER IS THEY WOULD SURROUND. 
14 MR. DE MONTREUX: YOUR HONOR, THAT IS TRUE. 
15 HOWEVER, WHEN YOU GOT THE ENTIRE EVIDENCE, WHEN YOU LOOK 
16 AT THE EVIDENCE OF THE VIDEOTAPE--
17 JUDGE YOUNG: THE WHAT? 
18 MR. DE MONTREUX: THE VIDEOTAPE FROM THE STORE'S 
19 CAMERA. THAT THE VIDEOTAPE THAT THEY RECORDED YOU WILL 
20 SEE, IF YOU HAD A CHANCE, WE SUBMITTED THAT INTO EVIDENCE, 
21 THAT THE INSTANT MR. PRIDDY ENTERED THE STORE HE BECAME A 
22 SUSPECT. THEY FOLLOWED HIM EVERYWHERE WITH THAT CAMERA. 
23 THOSE CAMERAS, WHEN MR. PRIDDY'S GIRL WOULD GO BEHIND SOME 
24 KIND OF DISPLAY THE CAMERA WOULD GO WIDE FOR HIM. IF THEY 
























AND WHEN THEY FIND MR. PRIDDY THEY WOULD PULL HIM IN, ZOOM 
HIM IN JUST TO FIND OUT EXACTLY, IN ORDER TO FIND OUT 
EXACTLY WHAT MR. PRIDDY WAS SHOPLIFTING. IF ANYTHING 
ELSE, THE EVIDENCE THAT THE STORE ALREADY HAD--AND THEY 
PUT, ANYWAY, BETWEEN 35 AND 45 MINUTES--EVIDENCE WOULD 
TELL THEM THIS MAN IS NOT SHOPLIFTING. THIS MAN NEVER 
WENT TO THE DOOR. HE NEVER WENT TO THE BATHROOM. HE WAS 
ALWAYS SHOPPING, LOOKING FOR COUPONS. THE CURLER THAT WAS 
IN THE DEFECTIVE SET WAS IN THE BASKET THAT THEY PUSH 
AROUND. THE NEW SET WAS CHOSEN AND PUT IN THE BASKET. 
THE STORE HAD NO REASON AT ALL--THE STORE KNEW MR. PRIDDY 
WAS NOT SHOPLIFTING. THE STORE DID NOT HAVE ANY GROUNDS 
TO STALK MR. PRIDDY OUTSIDE IN THE MALL AND SAID YOU WERE 
SHOPLIFTING. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I AM NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND THE 
PROFFER THAT YOU'RE JUST MAKING. IF I WALK THROUGH A 
STORE THERE IS NO--AND THEY FOLLOW ME WITH A CAMERA THE 
WHOLE TIME I'M THERE, AND THERE IS NO BASIS TO THINK I 
HAVE TAKEN ANYTHING, AND YET, SOME EMPLOYEE WHO IS 
SEPARATE FROM THE CAMERA OBSERVES ME AND THINKS I DID TAKE 
SOMETHING, WHY CAN'T THEY STOP ME? 
MR. DE MONTREUX: IT'S NOT JUST AN EMPLOYEE, 
23 I YOUR HONOR, THIS IS THE MANAGER, THIS IS THE PERSON 
24 I ACTUALLY IN CHARGE OF THIS KIND OF BUSINESS AT SHOPKO. 
THIS IS THE PERSON THAT IS IN CHARGE OF IT. IN FACT, THAT 
17 
25 
1 PERSON, AT SOME POINT IN THE INFORMATION, AND SOME FACTS 
2 OF THE CASE, SAYS, DIDN'T YOU SEE ME, I WAS WATCHING YOU. 
3 YOUR HONOR, IT HAPPENS, THAT WITH THE HELP OF THE VIDEO-
4 TAPE, THE DEFENDANT WAS ON NOTICE THAT NOTHING WAS WRONG, 
5 THAT MY CLIENT DID NOTHING WRONG. MY CLIENT DID NOT 
6 SHOPLIFT. THEY KNEW BECAUSE OF THE VIDEOTAPE THAT MY 
7 CLIENT WENT AND MADE AN EXCHANGE. THE EXCHANGE WAS MADE. 
8 THEY KNEW MY CLIENT STOOD BACK AND PAID. ALL THAT IS ON 
9 VIDEOTAPE. AND THEN MY CLIENT WALKED OUT OF THE STORE AND 
10 THEN THEY STILL STALKED MY CLIENT AND SAY, YOU WERE SHOP-
11 LIFTING, WE WANT TO LOOK IN YOUR BAG. IT IS WHEN YOU LOOK 
12 AT THE ENTIRE EVIDENCE IT SUPPORTS THE FACT THAT THEY DID 
13 NOT HAVE ANY REASON, ANY PRIVILEGE TO STALK MR. PRIDDY 
14 BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT--
15 JUDGE YOUNG: DON'T THEY HAVE THE PRIVILEGE TO 
16 STOP ANYONE? 
17 MR. DE MONTREUX: YOUR HONOR, IF THEY HAVE 
18 REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR IT. 
19 JUDGE YOUNG: IS THAT WHAT'S REQUIRED IN THE 
20 STATUTE? 
21 MR. DE MONTREUX: THAT'S WHAT'S REQUIRED. IF 
22 THEY HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION, A BONA FIDE SUSPICION 
23 THAT THERE WAS SOMEBODY STEALING IN THAT STORE OR SOMEBODY 
24 ACTED IN A FASHION TO WARRANT SUSPICION. 











"ANY MERCHANT WHO HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MERCHANDISE 
HAS BEEN WRONGFULLY TAKEN BY AN INDIVIDUAL CONTRARY TO, 
THEN THE CITED SECTIONS, AND THAT HE CAN RECOVER SUCH 
MERCHANDISE BY TAKING SUCH INDIVIDUAL INTO CUSTODY AND 
DETAINING HIM MAY, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTEMPTING TO EFFECT 
SUCH RECOVERY OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF INFORMING THE PEACE 
OFFICER OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUCH DETENTION, TAKE THE 
INDIVIDUAL INTO CUSTODY AND DETAIN HIM IN A REASONABLE 
MANNER AND FOR A REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME. SUCH TAKING 
10 I INTO CUSTODY AND DETENTION BY A MERCHANT OR HIS EMPLOYEE 
-I-I SHALL NOT RENDER SUCH MERCHANT OR HIS EMPLOYEE CRIMINALLY 
12 OR CIVILLY LIABLE FOR FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, 
13 SLANDER, OR LAWFUL DETENTION OR FOR ANY OTHER TYPE OF 
14 CLAIM OR ACTION UNLESS THE CUSTODY AND DETENTION ARE 
15 UNREASONABLE UNDER ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES." 
16 SO YOUR POSITION IS THAT IT IS A QUESTION OF 
17 FACT TO GO TO THE JURY AS TO WHETHER THE TAKING INTO 
1Q CUSTODY IS UNREASONABLE UNDER ALL OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES? 
19 MR. DE MONTREUX: YOUR HONOR, I DON'T BELIEVE 
20 THAT'S THE ISSUE BEFORE YOU. THE ISSUE IS WHETHER OR NOT 
21 THEY HAD REASON TO STOP. WHEN YOU STUDY THAT STATUTE, IN 
22 THAT VERY FIRST LINE YOU SAID, "IF THE MERCHANT HAS A 
REASON TO BELIEVE." 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. NOW DON'T I HAVE TO START 





1 BELIEVE, WHEN THE MERCHANT SAW SOMEONE WALK THROUGH THE 
2 CHECKOUT COUNTER WITH CURLERS THAT WERE THEN NOT PAID FOR, 
3 EVEN THOUGH THE PERSON WENT DIRECTLY TO THE SERVICE DESK? 
4 MR. DE MONTREUX: THE MERCHANT CAN AND HAS--THE 
5 MERCHANT HAS AT HIS DISPOSITION EVERY TOOL AVAILABLE TO 
6 FIND OUT THAT AN EXCHANGE WAS MADE EITHER BY CHECKING OUT 
7 WHERE THE CUSTOMER DESK IS AND ASKING, WAS AN EXCHANGE 
8 MADE--
9 JUDGE YOUNG: WELL NOW, THE MERCHANT DOESN'T 
10 HAVE THE LUXURY OF TIME ON THAT. WHEN THE PERSON IS 
11 LEAVING THE STORE AND HAS WALKED THROUGH THE CHECKOUT 
12 COUNTER WITH A NEW CONTAINER OF CURLERS, EVEN THOUGH THE 
13 EMPLOYEE MADE THE MISTAKE, ADMITTEDLY AND OPENLY NOW, THEN 
14 DON'T THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO BELIEVE THAT WHEN THEY 
15 HAVEN'T CHECKED IT OUT PROPERLY AT THE PAYMENT COUNTER 
16 THAT THEY MAY BE SHOPLIFTING? 
17 MR. DE MONTREUX: YOUR HONOR, ASSUME FOR THIS 
18 VERY SAME THING, AND IF YOU SO READ THE DEPOSITION, THE 
19 CLIENT OFFERED TO LET THEM LOOK IN THE BAG, OFFERED TO 
20 SHOW THEM THE RECEIPTS TO SHOW THAT EVERYTHING WAS 
21 CORRECT, EVEN BEFORE MY CLIENT LEFT THE STORE. 
22 JUDGE YOUNG: RIGHT. 
23 MR. DE MONTREUX: THEY KNEW EVERYTHING. IF 
24 THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE, THEY HAD ALL THE TIME IN THE 
25 WORLD TO DO WHATEVER THEY WANTED TO DO. THE FOLLOWING OF 
1 MY CLIENT. MY CLIENT STOPPED AT THE CASH REGISTER, A 
2 TELEPHONE CALL CAME TO THE CASHIER SAYING THAT APPARENTLY 
3 TO INFER SOMETHING, SAYING THAT THOSE PEOPLE ARE MAYBE 
4 SHOPLIFTING. MY CLIENT OFFERED TO LET THEM LOOK IN HIS 
5 BAG. MS. PRIDDY CAME BACK WITH THE CURLER AND STAYED WITH 
6 HIM AT THE CASH REGISTER. THAT IS ON THE FILM. EVERY-
7 THING IS CORRECT. EVERYTHING IS DONE. EVERYTHING IS IN 
8 THE PROPER BAGS. UNTIL THEY LEFT THE STORE. THERE WAS 
9 AMPLE TIME TO VERIFY EVERYTHING. THERE WAS NO GROUNDS 
10 WHATSOEVER. THE MERCHANT HAD NO GROUNDS TO STOP MR. 
11 PRIDDY OUT THERE AND ACCUSE HIM OF SHOPLIFTING. 
12 THE EVIDENCE IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE VIDEOTAPE, 
13 EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED IN THAT STORE CLEARLY SUPPORT 
14 THAT THERE WAS NO REASONABLE GROUND TO STOP HIM. THERE 
15 WAS AMPLE TIME TO INVESTIGATE. AN OFFER WAS MADE TO 
16 VERIFY EVERYTHING, THAT ALL OF THE EXCHANGE WAS MADE. 
17 IF WE ARE GOING TO READ THE STATUTE AS TO WHERE 
18 THE MERCHANT CAN SIMPLY JUST ACT ON IMPULSE, EVEN THOUGH 
19 THERE ARE NO REASONABLE GROUNDS, PEOPLE LIKE MY CLIENT 
20 WOULD NEVER HAVE A CHANCE TO COME TO THIS COURT AND ASSERT 
21 THEIR CLAIMS, YOUR HONOR. 
22 JUDGE YOUNG: ARE YOU FINISHED? 
23 MR. DE MONTREUX: SHALL I CONTINUE, YOUR HONOR? 
24 JUDGE YOUNG: ARE YOU FINISHED WITH YOUR 
25 I ARGUMENT? 
21 
1 MR. DE MONTREUX: NO. YOUR HONOR, THERE IS A 
2 STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS THAT ALL REASONABLE 
3 INFERENCE THAT SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE 
4 VIEWED IN FAVOR OF THE NON-MOVING PARTY. WHEN YOU LOOK AT 
5 THE EVIDENCE IN ITS ENTIRETY IT SUPPORTS MY CLIENT'S 
6 POSITION. 
7 DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT IS THAT IN THE DEPOSITION 
8 MY CLIENT DID NOT SAY THEY SAID, "I AM A THIEF." HOWEVER, 
9 IN LOOKING AT CERTAIN PAGES OF THIS DEPOSITION YOU CAN SEE 
10 THAT MY CLIENT, SHOPLIFTING--SHOPLIFTERS ARE SORT OF THE 
11 ENTIRE DEPOSITION. FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU ALLOW ME, I WILL 
12 SHOW YOU AT PAGE 78 OF THE DEPOSITION THE QUESTION WAS, 
13 "CAN YOU REMEMBER THE SUBSTANCE OF HER CONVERSATION?" AND 
14 THE ANSWER IS, "THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONVERSATION, WITHOUT 
15 RECALLING THE EXACT WORDS WAS THAT, YOU KNOW, SHE HAD 
16 OBSERVED US SHOPLIFTING, AN ATTEMPT TO SHOPLIFT. 
17 "QUESTION: WAS SHE SAYING THAT TO THE STORE 
18 MANAGER? 
19 "ANSWER: SHE WAS SAYING THAT TO ANYBODY IN 
20 EARSHOT. 
21 "QUESTION: SHE OBSERVED SHOPLIFTING? 
22 "ANSWER: YES, SHE OBSERVED SHOPLIFTING." 
23 I EVERYTHING IN THIS CASE POINTS TO THE FACT THAT 
MY CLIENT DID SAY THAT THEY ACCUSED HIM OF SHOPLIFTING. 




1 I SHOPLIFTING AT PARAGRAPH 10. THE AFFIDAVIT OF MY CLIENT 
2 DOES NOT IN ANY WAY--
3 I JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT WAS THAT WORD? 
4| MR. DE MONTREUX: AFFIDAVIT. THE TESTIMONY THAT 
5 I MY CLIENT GAVE SUPPORTS THE ANSWER. THAT IS NOT CONTRARY 
6 TO THE DEPOSITION. IT DOES NOTHING BUT AMPLIFY IT. 
7 YOUR HONOR, WE HAD AN EYE WITNESS AT THE CENTER, 
8 AT THE VERY CENTER OF THIS DISPUTE. THE EYE WITNESS WAS 
9 NOT DEPOSED. THAT EYE WITNESS, THEY HAVE SUPPLIED HER 
10 TESTIMONY TO YOU, IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT--IN SUPPORT OF 
11 PLAINTIFF, I'M SORRY. THE DEFENDANT HAS NOT ATTACKED THAT 
12 AFFIDAVIT. THE DEFENDANT KNEW FROM THE VERY BEGINNING 
13 THAT THAT WITNESS EXISTED. THE DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEPOSED 
14 THAT WITNESS. THE WITNESS TESTIFIED SHE HEARD THAT MY 
15 CLIENT WAS ACCUSED OF SHOPLIFTING IN THE PARKING LOT IN 
16 FRONT OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC. 
17 THERE IS A QUESTION OF PRIVILEGE, YOUR HONOR. 
18 OF COURSE, A MERCHANT HAS A PRIVILEGE. HOWEVER, A PRIVI-
19 LEGE SUBJECT TO ATTACK. AND THE LAW, I BELIEVE, WILL 
20 RENDER WHERE THERE IS MALICE THERE IS NO PRIVILEGE. AND 
21 THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE, THE VIDEOTAPE AND EVERYTHING 
22 SHOWS THAT THE REASON WHY MR. PRIDDY WAS STOPPED IS 
23 BECAUSE OF HIS RACE, MALICE. HE WAS FOLLOWED FOR SOME 45 
24 MINUTES AND HE WAS STOPPED OUT THERE AND ACCUSED OF SHOP-
25 I LIFTING WHEN THERE IS NO REASONS, NO GROUNDS TO ACCUSE HIM 
23 
1 OF IT. YOUR HONOR, THAT PRIVILEGE IS DIFFERENT. 
2 AS FAR AS EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS CONCERNED WE DID 
3 PLEAD NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. IT IS 
4 OUR INTENT TO AMEND OUR COMPLAINT TO ALLEGE INTENTIONAL 
5 INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BECAUSE OF THE EVIDENCE 
6 THAT WE HAVE DISCOVERED THROUGH DISCOVERY OF THIS CASE. 
7 THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
8 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. DO YOU WISH TO REPLY, 
9 MR. PIERCEY? 
10 MR. PIERCEY: YES, YOUR HONOR. YOUR HONOR, THIS 
11 IS EXACTLY THE SORT OF SITUATION THAT THE COURT IN WEBSTER 
12 V. SILL TRIED TO ADDRESS IN PREVENTING A PLAINTIFF FROM 
13 MOVING AWAY AND DISOWNING THE PLAINTIFF'S OWN TESTIMONY IN 
14 A DEPOSITION. IN THE COMPLAINT--THIS WAS ONE OF THE 
15 PROBLEMS THAT GAVE RISE TO THE TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION. 
16 IN THE COMPLAINT THE ALLEGATION IS THAT THERE 
17 WAS A LOUD ACCUSATION OF SHOPLIFTING AND THERE WERE 
18 LETTERS BACK AND FORTH, BUT THERE WAS NOTHING EVER SAID 
19 ABOUT THE WORDS OR THE WORDS TO THAT EFFECT THAT WERE 
20 SPOKEN. AND THIS IS--WE'VE CITED THE BOISJOLY CASE, JUDGE 
21 WINDER'S DECISION, ABOUT IT'S IMPORTANT TO HAVE PARTICU-
22 LARITY WHEN YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT SLANDER BECAUSE IF YOU'RE 
23 SAYING YOU WERE SLANDERED YOU OUGHT TO SAY WHAT THOSE 
24 WORDS WERE. AND THE REASON FOR TAKING THE DEPOSITION WAS 
25 TO GET PAST THIS "LOUDLY ACCUSED," BECAUSE AS THE 
24 
1 PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION SHOWS THE WORDS, IN FACT WHAT HE 
2 SAYS IS, SOMETIMES WHAT'S NOT SAID IS MOST IMPORTANT HERE. 
3 SO AS FAR AS THE PLAINTIFF IS CONCERNED HE THINKS, HE 
4 THOUGHT THAT IT IS NOT IMPORTANT WHETHER OR NOT HE WAS 
5 CALLED A THIEF, WHAT'S IMPORTANT IS HE FELT THAT WAY, I 
6 GUESS. SO THE REASON FOR THE DEPOSITION IS TO GET OVER 
7 THAT AND FIND OUT WHAT WAS SAID. 
8 JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME ASK YOU THIS. SUPPOSE, 
9 GIVEN THAT ALL OF THEIR EVIDENCE MUST BE VIEWED IN THE 
10 LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE NON-MOVING PARTY, IF IT IS 
11 TRUE THAT THE STORE HAD OBSERVED HIM BY VIDEOTAPE FOR 45 
12 MINUTES, AND THE VIDEOTAPE DOES NOT SHOW ANY ACTIVITY THAT 
13 WOULD BE AKIN TO SHOPLIFTING, WHAT REASONABLE BASIS IS 
14 THERE, WHAT REASON TO BELIEVE, AS THE STATUTE REQUIRES, IS 
15 THERE THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EMPLOYEES TO CONCLUDE THAT 
16 THERE HAD BEEN THE POTENTIAL OF SHOPLIFTING? JUST THE 
17 WALKING THROUGH THE COUNTER? 
18 MR. PIERCEY: YOUR HONOR, THERE IS--YES. I 
19 THINK THAT'S CORRECT. 
20 JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. NOW LET ME JUST TAKE IT ONE 
21 STEP FURTHER. SHOULDN'T I REQUIRE THIS MATTER THEN TO GO 
22 TO A JURY TO DECIDE WHETHER THAT ACTION FORMED AN ADEQUATE 
23 BASIS, THAT'S A FACTUAL QUESTION, AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR 
24 THE EMPLOYER, OR THE MERCHANT, TO BELIEVE REASONABLY THAT 
25 MERCHANDISE WAS BEING WRONGFULLY TAKEN? 
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1
 MR. PIERCEY: YOUR HONOR, I THINK THERE ARE TWO 
2
 REASONS THAT THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE CLAIM. AND THE 
3
 FIRST IS THAT THE QUESTION ISN'T WHAT SOMEBODY WOULD HAVE 
4
 DONE WITH PERFECT KNOWLEDGE. THAT'S NOT WHAT THE STATUTE 
5
 IS ADDRESSED TO. OBVIOUSLY, IF THERE WAS PERFECT KNOW-
6
 LEDGE THEN NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN, BUT A STATUTE IS 
7
 ADDRESSED TO WHEN THERE'S A REASON TO BELIEVE, AND THEN 
8
 THE INFORMATION COMES IN THAT IT'S NOT A CASE OF SHOP-
9
 LIFTING AND TO PROTECT THE MERCHANT IN MAKING THAT 
10
 INQUIRY. 
11 NOW, THE PLAINTIFF TALKS ABOUT THE VIDEOTAPE, 
12 SHOWING THE ABSENCE OF PRIVILEGE, AS POINTED OUT IN THE 
13 WEST CASE, IS THE PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN. AND THE PLAINTIFF 
14 HASN'T DONE ANYTHING. THEY TALK ABOUT THIS VIDEOTAPE, BUT 
15 AS THE COURT POINTED OUT, THERE'S AN EMPLOYEE AND THIS 
16 EMPLOYEE, THIS EMPLOYEE SEES THEM COME IN WITH THE NON-
17 SHOPKO BAG. DOESN'T MEAN THEY ARE GOING TO SHOPLIFT, 
18 DOESN'T MEAN THEY ARE NOT GOING TO SHOPLIFT, BUT IT'S 
19 SOMETHING THAT SOMEONE COULD PUT SOMETHING IN. SO THEY 
20 SEE THEM COME IN WITH A NON-SHOPKO BAG AND THEY SEE THEM 
21 LEAVE AND THEY SEE HIS FIANCEE TAKE SOMETHING THROUGH THE 
22 CHECKOUT. AND SO THE QUESTION IS--AND THEN THEY GO OUT. 
23 AND THEN AS YOUR HONOR POINTED OUT, THEY SAY THEY WANTED 
24 TO LOOK IN THE BAG. AND THE PLAINTIFF COULD SAY THERE 
25 MUST BE SOME MISTAKE, OR WE'VE MADE AN EXCHANGE, OR, YOU 
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1 KNOW, WHAT'S YOUR CONCERN, BUT THE PLAINTIFFS--AND THAT, 
2 YOUR HONOR, IS SQUARELY WITHIN THE STATUTE, SECTION 17, 
3 BUT THE PLAINTIFF SAYS NO AND THEN--AND I THINK, YOUR 
4 HONOR, THIS GETS TO THE SECOND QUESTION. THE PLAINTIFF'S 
5 OWN TESTIMONY IS THAT THE EMPLOYEE RECOGNIZED A MISTAKE, 
6 YOUR HONOR, AND SO THERE WERE REASONS TO BELIEVE, BUT THE 
7 PLAINTIFF--THE EMPLOYEE RECOGNIZED A MISTAKE, THAT WAS THE 
8 END OF IT. 
9 BUT, YOUR HONOR, THE SECOND REASON IS--AND I 
10 THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND WHAT THE CLAIMS ARE 
11 THAT ARE BEING MADE HERE. THE FIRST CLAIM IS SLANDER AND 
12 THE SECOND CLAIM IS NEGLIGENT INFLICTION. AND THERE ISN'T 
13 ANY CLAIM HERE OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT. WHAT HAPPENED WAS 
14 THAT THEY GO OUT, THEY ASKED THE QUESTION ALOUD, BY 
15 SECTION 17, AND THE PLAINTIFF SAYS NO. AND THEN THEY SAY, 
16 LET'S GO IN THE OFFICE AND THE PLAINTIFF SAYS FINE. HE 
17 SAYS FINE, THAT'S A GOOD IDEA, OR FINE, LET'S DO THAT. 
18 AND SO--EVEN THOUGH THE PLAINTIFF SAYS THAT AT THE 
19 CHECKOUT COUNTER HE MADE AN OFFER TO LET THE CHECKOUT 
20 PERSON LOOK IN THE BAG, THAT'S NOT--WE'VE GOT TO TALK 
21 ABOUT THE EMPLOYEE WHO MADE THE REQUEST. AND HE DOESN'T 
22 SAY THAT THE EMPLOYEE WAS THERE OR THAT SHE HAD THE OPPOR-
23 TUNITY TO LOOK IN THE BAG THEN. 
24 AND SO THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT MR. PRIDDY, 
25 I RATHER THAN BE WILLING TO TALK AT THAT POINT, SAID, FINE, 
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1 LET'S GO IN THE OFFICE. THEN THEY GO IN THE OFFICE, HE 
2 WON'T TALK TO HER, HE REFUSES TO SIT DOWN. HE SAYS, LET 
3 ME SEE THE MANAGER. THE MANAGER COMES IN. NOW, TO THE 
4 MANAGER, HE'LL EXPLAIN, HE'LL EXPLAIN WHAT HAPPENED. THEY 
5 SAY, WE MADE AN EXCHANGE AND THEY TELL ABOUT IT AND THEN 
6 THEY REALIZE THE MISTAKE WAS MADE. 
7 NOW, THESE ARE JUST BALD ASSERTIONS AND STATE-
8 MENTS ABOUT MALICE. THEY'RE CONTRADICTED BY THE DEPOSI-
9 TION WHICH RECOGNIZES THE MISTAKE. AND THIS WASN'T A CASE 
10 OF, THIS WASN'T A CASE OF DETENTION. IT WAS A CASE WHERE 
11 A QUESTION WAS ASKED AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT WILLING TO 
12 TALK THEN, BUT WAS WILLING TO GO IN AND TALK, SO HE WASN'T 
13 HELD AGAINST HIS WILL. AND THAT--AND SO I THINK THE 
14 PROPER STANDARD IS RECOGNIZED IN BREHANY. THE CLAIM IS 
15 SLANDER. THERE WAS NO DEFAMATORY STORY BUT, IN ADDITION 
16 TO THAT, BREHANY SAYS THERE'S GOT TO BE ROOM, LATITUDE FOR 
17 MISTAKE. AND THAT'S ALL THIS WAS. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT MET 
18 THE BURDEN OF SHOWING ANY FACTS TO SHOW MALICE OR LACK OF 
19 REASON IN THE MIND OF THE EMPLOYEE. 
20 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. PIERCEY. 
21 MR. PIERCEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
22 JUDGE YOUNG: THE COURT FINDS THAT THE MOTION 
23 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AND THE SAME IS HEREBY 
24 GRANTED. THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS A REASONABLE 
25 I BASIS TO MAKE A REQUEST AND THAT THERE SHOULD HAVE SIMPLY 
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1 BEEN COOPERATION. HAD MR. PRIDDY COOPERATED IN THE 
2 PARKING LOT HE WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN TAKEN BACK INTO THE 
3 OFFICE. WHEN HE WENT INTO THE OFFICE THEY SIMPLY 
4 EXPLAINED THE CASE. AND 78-12-17 AND -18 ALLOW A MERCHANT 
5 TO MAKE A REQUEST UNDER A REASONABLE BASIS. AND THE COURT 
6 FINDS THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD REALLY NOT DIFFER ON THE 
7 BASIS THAT TAKING CURLERS OFF THE SHELF, THROUGH THE 
8 CHECKOUT COUNTER, EVEN THOUGH YOU WENT TO A SERVICE 
9 COUNTER, COULD HAVE CAUSED A REASONABLE BASIS TO THINK 
10 SOMETHING WAS AWRY. AND THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO STOP 
11 PEOPLE AND TO INQUIRE OF THEM AS TO THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES. 
12 AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY EASY FOR MR. PRIDDY TO SIMPLY 
13 SAY, WELL, THERE MUST BE A MISTAKE HERE, I'LL EXPLAIN TO 
14 YOU WHAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE, WE EXCHANGED THESE. AND 
15 THAT COULD HAVE WELL BEEN TAKEN CARE OF. 
16 I DON'T THINK IT'S REASONABLE TO EXPECT EVERYONE 
17 TO BE AWARE OF THE CONTENT OF A VIDEOTAPE THAT IS BEING 
18 RECORDED IN AN OFFICE. AND THAT IS, ALL OF THE OTHER 
19 EMPLOYEES TO BE AWARE OF THAT, WHO WENT OUT. 
20 I DON'T FIND THE FACT THAT SIX EMPLOYEES STOPPED 
21 HIM TO BE UNREASONABLE BECAUSE YOU USUALLY WOULD WANT TO 
22 STOP SOMEBODY WITH THE EVIDENCE, THAT YOU CAN DETAIN THEM 
23 IF THEY DECIDE TO FLEE. SO THE EMPLOYEES GOING OUT IN 
24 THAT WAY, AS LONG AS THEY ARE COURTEOUS, AND THE SIX HERE 
25 SEEM THAT THEY WERE, AND MR. PRIDDY'S TESTIMONY SEEMS TO 
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AFFIRM THAT, AND ON THAT BASIS THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
IF YOU WILL PREPARE THE ORDER, MR. PIERCEY, 
CONSISTENT BOTH WITH YOUR PLEADINGS AND THE RECORD? 
MR. PIERCEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. DE MONTREUX: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 


























C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS 
SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE HEARING 
ON THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE SET 
OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE 
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT 
THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
!ILEEN Ml AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 14TH, 1996 
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